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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

t

JULIO GODINEZ,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880301-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(i) [or (iv)] (1986) (Amended 1987).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict conviction defendant.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The State relies on the following statutory provision
in this matter.
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (1986)
(Amended 1987):
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:

(i) produce, manufacture, or
dispense, or to possess with
intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
• • • •

(iv) possess a controlled or
counterfeit substance with intent
to distribute
(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in
Schedule I or II is guilty of a
second degree felony. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Julio Godinez, was charged with Possession
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i)
(1986) (Amended 1987).

The correct citation for that violation

is Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) but the Information lists
subsection (i) with the language of Possession with Intent to
Distribute.
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, on March 25, 1988,
following a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was

sentenced by Judge Rokich on May 9, 1988, to the Utah State
Prison for not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $10,000.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 9, 1987, Detective William McCarthy
conducted surveillance on the Motel 6 located as Sixth South and
200 East, Salt Lake City (T. 72-73).

The detective was assigned

to watch specifically Room 223 of the Motel as well as a suspect
vehicle described as a Plymouth 4-door, license plate number
821BJC (T. 75-76).

Upon arrival at 3:15 p.m., the detective

spotted the suspect vehicle parked in the motel parking lot, and
also observed at least two individuals inside Room 223 (T. 78).
About one hour later, two people, later identified as Mr. Julio
Godinez and Fernando Florez, left Room 223, walked around the
building, and proceeded to Room 225 (T. 78-80).

Rooms 223 and

225 of the Motel 6 are on the same level, same side, and are
separated by a single room (T. 112). Mr. Godinez opened the door
with a key and both men walked inside (T. 84). The two men
remained in Room 225 for approximately seven minutes then left
again, going around the building, and re-entering Room 223 (T.
84-86).

About one-half hour later, John Pender (an informant)

and Pablo Lafarga went to Room 223 (T. 86-87).

Lafarga carried a

brown paper bag (T. 87). They were there about one minute when
Mr. Godinez and Fernando once again left, went around the
building, and proceeded to Room 225, but did not enter (T. 8889).

Mr. Godinez went downstairs to the parking lot and opened

the suspect vehicle, possibly for a key to the room, thereafter
both men entered Room 225 (T. 89-91).
About ten minutes later Mr. Godinez and Fernando left
Room 225, went around the building, and entered Room 223 (T. 92).

At this point all the individuals that Detective McCarthy had
seen were in Room 223 (T. 92). They were there only minutes when
Pender left (T. 92). About twenty minutes later, Mr. Godinez and
Fernando left Room 223, went around the building, and entered
Room 225 (T. 92). Fernando carried something in his coat which
Detective McCarthy could readily observe from a distance of less
than two hundred feet but he couldn't tell what it was (T. 92).
Mr. Godinez opened the door and let Fernando in Room 225 (T. 93).
Five or six minutes later, Mr. Godinez left Room 225, "went his
normal route,M and returned to Room 225 approximately nine
minutes later (T. 93). About one hour later, Lafarga exited Room
223 only to pace on the balcony and return to Room 223 (T. 9394).

Pender returned and went to Room 223, eventually leaving

with LaFarga (T. 94).
Later Mr. Godinez and Fernando left Room 225, went
around the building and entered Room 223 (T. 95). Thereafter Mr.
Godinez and Fernando exited Room 223 and proceeded toward the van
of Detective Mc Carthy, a possible counter-surveillance maneuver
(T. 95-96, 120). Fernando walked on the east side of the street,
pacing back and forth, standing back in the bushes in the shadows
of a wall (T. 96, 99). Mr. Godinez crossed the street to the
west side, walked up to the surveillance van and attempted to
look inside; at that point the detective called for a back-up (T.
96-97, 137). Mr. Godinez then returned to Room 225, and Fernando
returned to Room 223.
Based on what the officers had seen they sought a
telephonic search warrant.

While waiting for the warrant,
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Detective McCarthy and another officer entered Room 225 with a
passkey (T. 100). Mr. Godinez was alone in the room, sitting on
the bed (T. 100). He was patted down, but no weapons were found
(T. 101-03).

A similar entry was made into Room 223 by other

officers (T. 103). Once the search warrant arrived, the room was
searched (T. 105). The bed Mr. Godinez was sitting on was
searched by the police and a plastic bag was found under the
pillow between the mattress and the headboard; the bag contained
approximately one pound of cocaine (T. 107-08, 182, 202). A
bindle of a different strength cocaine was found in a cup in the
bathroom (T. 157, 182). Mr. Godinez was relatively calm until
the cocaine was discovered in the bed (T. 181). At the time of
the discovery, Mr. Godinez had a look of "surprise" and "dismay,"
appearing extremely nervous, raising up and down from his chair,
and recrossing his legs several times (T. 167-68).

During this

time Mr. Godinez "defecated himself" (T. 109).
Mr. Godinez communicated to the police that he was a
jewelry salesman in Salt Lake to sell jewelry (T. 151). He also
indicated that he had been in Salt Lake three days, and was the
sole occupant of Room 225, having had no visitors (T. 151-52).
At the time of the arrest Mr. Godinez admitted that he had sold
no jewelry (T. 152).
Along with the cocaine, the police recovered a ring
display box with rings inside, a suitcase, a briefcase containing
miscellaneous items, personal items belonging to Mr. Godinez,
including a wallet and items of identification, along with three
airline passes round-trip from Los Angeles to Salt Lake via

-*-

Tucson (T. 105, 154, 162, 164, 202). Items of luggage, a
briefcase and other personal items were found in the room but the
record does not specify to whom they belonged (T. 2020).

The

airplane tickets were made out to Mr. Godinez using his middle
name (T. 153-54, 169-70).

Scales were found in Room 223 (T.

206).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based on the officers' observations during surveillance
and the statements made by defendant at his arrest, there is
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband seized
to support the jury's verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF POSSESSION
OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.
Defendant's appeal arises out of his conviction of
Possession of Cocaine with the Intent to Distribute.

Utah Code

Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a) (1986) (Amended 1987) provides:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is
unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally . . . (i) to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense,
a controlled or counterfeit substance; [or]
. . . [to] (iv) possess a controlled or
counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
Under this statutory language the prosecution was
required to prove:

(1) defendant knowingly and intentionally

possessed; (2) a controlled substance; and (3) he had the intent
to distribute the same.

The jury, as trier of fact, found the

_£_

evidence was sufficient to establish these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Defendant's sole contention in Point I of his brief is
that the prosecution failed to establish the element of
possession.

He claims that the State did not show that he had

actual or even constructive possession of the controlled
substances because of the nonexclusive use of the motel room
where the controlled substance was found, that others did in fact
share his room at least some of the time.
As a general principle, to successfully challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, defendant
must show "that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial
that a reasonable mind must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that defendant committed the crime."

State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d

72, 74 (Utah 1981) .
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443
(Utah 1983), specifically set forth the standard for reversing a
conviction on insufficient evidence:
In considering that question, we review the
evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed,
is so inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).

With respect to the sufficiency of

the State's evidence to establish the element of possession, the
State concedes that defendant was not in actual physical
possession of the controlled substance at the time it was

discovered and seized by officers.

However, the evidence in this

case, when viewed as a whole, was sufficient to establish
defendant's constructive possession of cocaine beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that

constructive possession is sufficient to establish the element of
possession of controlled substance.

The doctrine of constructive

possession was stated in State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709
(Utah 1980):
Constructive possession is generally applied
to those circumstances where the drug is not
found on the person of the defendant nor in
his presence, but is found in a place under
his dominion and control and under
circumstances which it can be reasonably
inferred that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the existence of the narcotics.
Exclusive control of the place in which the
narcotics are found is not necessary.
^d. at 712.
The Court in the recent case of State v. Bingham, 732
P.2d 132 (Utah 1987), upheld a conviction for possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute for value under the
constructive possession theory stating:
Constructive possession is proved by
establishing a connection between the accused
and the drug sufficient to permit an
inference that the accused had both the
ability and the intent to exercise dominion
or control over it.
^Id. at 133, citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985).
The State clearly established defendant's dominion and
control over Room 225 at Motel 6, where the cocaine was
discovered.

The defendant indicated to the police at the time of

his arrest that he was the sole occupant of Room 225 at Motel 6,
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having had no visitors (T. 151, 152). Though it was established
that others had visited the room for short periods of time on the
night of the arrest, the surveillance officer testified that each
time Room 225 was entered, it was made accessible by defendant
with his key (T. 89-91, 93). Further, it was established that
most of the items seized in Room 225 at the time of the arrest
were attributable to defendant, including his personal
possessions, a ring box, and three airline tickets (T. 105, 154,
164).

Finally, defendant was the only individual present in Room

225 at the time of the arrest and was sitting on the bed where
the drug was discovered (T. 101).
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), the Court
indicated that "whether a sufficient nexus between the accused
and the drug exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case."

Ld. at 319, citing State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258,

1264 (Utah 1983).

As indicated by the appellant, the Court in

Fox held that:
ownership and/or occupancy of the premises
upon which the drugs are found, although
important factors, are not alone sufficient
to establish constructive possession,
especially when occupancy is not exclusive.
Id., citing United States v. Davis# 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1977).

But the Court in Fox went on to say that other factors

-might combine to show a nexus between the accused and the drug."
Id.

These factors include "incriminating behavior of the

accused,"

.Id., citing United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th

Cir. 1981):

"presence of drugs in a specific area over which the

accused had control . . . "

Id.,

citing Walker v. United States,
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489 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) and "presence of drug paraphernalia
among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the
accused has special control."

Jd., citing United States v.

James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

The State

submitted sufficient evidence that the jury could have found that
the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine.
The bahavior of the defendant was incriminating.
Defendant went back and forth between Rooms 225 and 223 a number
of times on the night of the arrest.

Each time the defendant

changed rooms, he chose to walk around the building before
entering the other room (T. 80, 84, 88-89, 92-93, 95), even
though Rooms 225 and 223 were on the same level, same side and
separated by only a single room (T. 112). Further, defendant and
Fernando exited the Motel in a possible counter-surveillance
maneuver (T. 95-96, 260). Defendant approached and attempted to
look inside the surveillance van, while Fernando took a position
across the street in the shadows near a wall and in some bushes
(T. 96-97, 99, 137). Moreover, defendant acted relaxed up until
the time the drugs were discovered (T. 181). At that time his
behavior changed dramatically as defendant became extremely
nervous, moving up and down from his chair and crossing his legs
back and forth (T. 167-68).

Defendant finally "defecated

himself" (T. 109). Finally, the airline tickets seized at the
time of the arrest were somewhat suspiciously made out to the
defendant using his middle name (T. 153-54, 169-70).

There was

no clear explanation as to why the defendant had done so,
although it was testified that other identification seized by the

officers was in the defendant's first name (T. 153, 162). Other
incriminating behavior includes the defendant's association with
the individuals in Room 225 and his entrance into the suspect
vehicle (T. 88-89).
There was the presence of drugs in a specific area over
which the defendant had control. As indicated earlier, the
defendant explained that he was the sole occupant of Room 225;
access by other individuals was made possible by the defendant
with his key.

Further, the one pound block of cocaine was found

on the very bed on which the defendant was sitting when the
officers entered Room 225 at the time of the arrest (T. 101, 10708).
Finally, there was the presence of drug paraphernalia
among a place where the defendant had special control.

The

cocaine found in Room 225 was approximately in a one half kilo
(one pound) block.

It is logical that prior to any type of sale

the block would be weighed to determine its exact weight.

A

scale capable of measuring minute amounts of any substance and
which can be used for weighing drugs was discovered in Room 223.
Though it is clear that the defendant did not have exclusive
control or occupancy of Room 223, he did in fact enter that room
on a number of occasions during the night of the arrest, his
access thereto was presumably never denied.

Therefore, the State

maintains that such access to Room 223 allowed the defendant to
have special control over the items therein, including the
scales.

Defendant in his brief has given other explanations for
his actions.

Though other explanations are possible, they are

not logical in light of the immense circumstancial evidence
indicating the defendant had constructive possession of the
cocaine.

Nonetheless, these other explanations need not be

accepted by this Court, for this Court under the standard set
forth in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), must review
"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury."
Id. at 444.

The jury obviously did not accept defendant's

explanation of his activities that evening.

There is nothing

inherently improbable in the version of the facts accepted by the
jury which could cause this Court to reverse defendant's
conviction.

The evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain

defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's conviction.
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iv

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The so-called "test" referred to as "reasonable and necessary"1 is jabberwocky.2 It
certainly sounds like a legal test, but nobody will admit confusion or ignorance.3 State
Farm's unauthorized imposition of the undefined and standardless "test" which results in
retroactive denial and prospective suspension of PIP benefits has killed the legislature's
intent that injured motorists should be able to recover the reasonable value of all their
out-of-pocket expenses within 30 days of providing reasonable proof.4

1

As explained in Plaintiffs' opening Brief at n. 5, State Farm's combination of
"reasonable [value]" with "necessary" and its assertion that this improper combination of
defined and undefined words is a "test" is, standing alone, bad faith and fraud. While
Plaintiffs believed that there was utility in using "reasonable and necessary" in their
opening Brief, it is no longer a useful fiction. The question presented to the Court is the
interpretation and implementation of the word "necessary."
2

"'It seems very pretty,' she said when she had finished it, 'but it's rather hard to
understand!' (You see she didn't like to confess even to herself, that she couldn't make it
out at all.) 'Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas — only I don't exactly know
what they are! However, somebody killed something: that's clear, at any rate — '"
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, ch. 1, 1872 (Alice's critique of the poem
Jabberwocky (as opposed to the adjective "jabberwocky" used herein)).
3

Neither judges nor lawyers are capable of understanding or applying the "test;"
rather State Farm relies wholly on insurance doctors. Certainly, the stock phrases and
"magic words" beloved by State Farm carry no talismanic assurance of comprehension by
injured motorists untrained in the law. See Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P.2d
1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989).
4

"Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be denied benefits
unless a provision in the statutory contract between the [insured motorist], the state,
and the [PIP carrier] explicitly suspends the benefits." King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act) (citation omitted).
The foregoing statement of law is even more suited to PIP contracts for several reasons:
(1) PIP medical benefits are limited to $3,000; (2) PIP contracts are first-party contracts
for which the insured has personally paid the premium, whereas injured employees are
third-party claimants; and (3) The current statutory language of the no-fault statute
affords no delay.

ARGUMENT
I.

FOREIGN STATES' CONCLUSIONS ARE NEITHER
RELEVANT NOR PERSUASIVE.

State Farm relies heavily (almost exclusively) on the bare conclusions asserted by
various appellate courts from various foreign jurisdictions. It does not make the slightest
effort to analyze those states' no-fault statutes5 or to compare them to Utah's no-fault
statute. See State Farm's Brief at pp. 15-17. State Farm's reliance is misplaced.
Note that the no-fault systems in this country are wholly statutory
systems. It is incumbent upon any practitioner to ascertain the exact
language of the statute in effect at the pertinent time, as the statute is
the primary source of both rights under the plan, and the procedures
to be followed in obtaining those rights.
It is generally agreed that victims of traffic mishaps should receive
compensation for their out-of-pocket medical expenses and loss of
earnings as such expenses accrue, in lieu of having to first pursue a
claim in tort through to settlement or final judgment. Indeed, the
purposes pronounced for no-fault plans are generally in close
agreement; it is the manner in which to achieve these goals on
which there are a variety of opinions, leading to some significant
differences in the specifics of the plans that have been adopted.
The statutory schemes .. . change rapidly and with some frequency.
Any specific details of a given state's statute should thus be
viewed as illustrative of a viewpoint on no-fault, rather than a
guarantee that a specific jurisdiction follows such a plan. The
practitioner must always evaluate the statute as it existed on the
relevant date in the relevant jurisdiction.
Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:1 and Couch on Insurance 3d. §125:5 (emphasis added).
5

For example, some states amended their no-fault statutes to include "medical
management" and some (e.g., Connecticut and Georgia) have abandoned the tort
threshold. In addition, State Farm appended two rulings denying class certification in PIP
cases perhaps misleadingly implying nationwide unanimity. But see Exhibit D.
2

The only justification given by State Farm for its practices is that the "potential for
fraud[6]... is virtually unlimited." See State Farm's Brief at p. 16. Plaintiffs have never
argued that State Farm cannot protect itself against fraud. Plaintiffs have never argued
that State Farm cannot protect itself against bad faith. Plaintiffs have never argued that
State Farm cannot investigate7 claims. Plaintiffs only argue that State Farm cannot
substitute the opinions of insurance doctors for the decisions of treating physicians. PIP
coverage insures against loss.8 "Medical" disagreements are wholly irrelevant.
II.

THE RISK TRANSFERRED IS "ALL EXPENSES," THE
INSURED'S OBLIGATION IS "PROOF OF THE FACT AND
AMOUNT OF EXPENSES INCURRED" AND "NECESSARY"
MUST BE INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE.

The no-fault statute's insuring clause both defines and limits coverage. The term
"involving"9 in the primary portion of Section 308 (for the named insured and relatives)

6

Plaintiffs agree that the potential for fraud is great, Plaintiffs alleged that PIPrelated fraud is disproportionately committed by PIP carriers, and Plaintiffs have properly
alleged that State Farm committed fraud in its handling of the Class's claims.
7

To the contrary, Plaintiffs complain that State Farm did not investigate or fairly
evaluate their claims. For example, Mrs. Tucker's "pre-existing condition" was the
pretextual justification for denying her claim. If State Farm had investigated the claim,
perhaps it would have learned that "pre-existing condition" is not a valid basis for denial
of PIP benefits. See Couch on Insurance 3d, §171:49 at p. 171-66. And State Farm's
insurance doctor's argument regarding Mr. Tucker's x-ray is some sort of "intervening
cause" or "superseding negligence" argument which relies on "foreseeability" which is an
element of "proximate causation" which has nothing to do with the no-fault statute.
8

See, £&, Wilde v. Mid-Centurv Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981)
(explaining that proof of loss for PIP household services benefits requires that the insured
"simply . . . show[ that the insured] was disabled....").
9

The primary focus of the no-fault statute is "prompt and efficient"
reimbursement of injured insureds' out-of-pocket expenses without proof of "causation."
3

and the term "arising out o f in the omnibus provision are not to be construed to extend
coverage to an injured person unless the accident "involves" a motor vehicle.10 UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-308.

Similarly, if Plaintiffs were to translate State Farm's bald assertions into legal
terminology, Subsection 307(1 )(a) is an extension-type clause which defines the scope of
coverage, but State Farm asserts that the word "necessary"11 contained in the clause could
arguably imply some degree of limitation, and, certainly, the defined term "reasonable
value" serves as a limitation on the scope of PIP coverage.12 If the word "necessary" were
a coverage term, it is true that "necessary" could be defined (in isolation) as requiring a
medical treatment to be absolutely unavoidable (i.e., that the insured would suffer at least

The phraseology employed by the legislature in the insuring clause was "involving"
together with its narrower cousin "arising out of," and the no-fault statute never mentions
their much narrower relation "caused by" (except in the tort threshold clause) even
though State Farm's "reasonable and necessary" defense is essentially a
"proximate causation" or "legal liability" argument in purported reliance upon the risk
clause (a.k.a. the coverage clause). See, e.g.. Meadow Valley Contractors v.
Transcontinental Ins. Co.. 2001 UT App 190 atfflf12-15, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 29.
10

In other words, the insuring clause answers the question: Who? State Farm
does not dispute that Plaintiffs are insureds under Section 308.
11

If it were a "coverage term," the meaning of the word "necessary" would have
to have been made more clear by, for example, appending a prepositional phrase such as:
"necessary in the opinion of
"just like the legislature did when it appended a
prepositional phrase to "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred."
12

Indemnification for all out-of-pocket expenses within 30 days is limited by a
term which limits the coverage itself: "reasonable value." "Reasonable value" is,
therefore, a "coverage term." Specifically, an insured faces a rebuttable presumption that
he or she is not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of medical treatment (or other
covered items) which exceed the price controls imposed under Section 307's RVS.
4

death if he or she did not receive certain medical treatment). The word "necessary" could
also be defined as requiring a medical treatment to be merely convenient or subjectively
helpful. Because both interpretations are tenable, the word is ambiguous. "[A]ny
ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor
of coverage." LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Also,
because the policy is an adhesion contract, any ambiguity must be construed against the
insurer. See id, It necessarily follows that State Farm's insistence that the ambiguity of a
single word gives it "wide latitude" to deny PIP claims and discontinue PIP benefits is
preposterous. See State Farm's Brief at p. 16.
III.

THE WORD "NECESSARY" IS A COLLATERAL
REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR CONDITION
CONTAINED IN THE COVERAGE (i.e., RISK) CLAUSE.

Sometimes legalese is much easier to understand than plain language.13 The word
"necessary" is contained in a clause which extends coverage to the insured. In other
words, it is contained in the clause which defines the amount of the risk which is to be
13

For example, State Farm insists on calling its doctor's conclusion relying on
"reasonable and necessary" a "statutory predicate." State Farm refuses to explain what, if
anything, "reasonable and necessary" means, and its "clarifying" term "statutory
predicate" is absolutely unintelligible. Plaintiffs are, therefore, forced to fully argue State
Farm's mere assertions so that the flaws inherent in its analysis can be laid bare. See
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Or.. 2000 UT 90, f 19, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is
obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to
act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions
a party and its counsel make in litigation."); see also S&G. Inc. v. Intermountain Power
Agency. 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) ("S&G's argument does not withstand scrutiny. The
change order could not have created a condition precedent to a claim that had accrued ten
months earlier."); Hertz v. Nordic Ltd. Inc.. 761 P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (stating
"no one can avail himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has
himself occasioned its non-performance").
5

transferred to the PIP carrier through the contractual relationship (hereinafter the
"coverage clause" or "scope of coverage").
More precisely, the word "necessary" is either: (a) a coverage term which limits the
risk transferred by the policy, or (b) a collateral representation, warranty or condition. See
Couch on Insurance 3d, §101:6. If the word "necessary" were a coverage term, the
analysis of its use would involve identifying the additional burden which could be placed
upon the insured and the resulting process's effect on the insured's substantive right of
indemnification; whereas, if the word "necessary" is a collateral representation, condition
or warranty, it relates to a subjective representation14 made by the insured which, if
breached (by the insured's fraud or bad faith), would give rise to a PIP carrier's right to
attempt to void the underlying insurance contract.
The word "necessary," unlike the defined term "reasonable value," is a collateral
representation, warranty or condition which does not limit the coverage15 available to an
insured. Rather, it serves as the insured's promise of good faith in connection with
medical treatment decisions.
The Court may not permit State Farm to confuse the "coverage" requirement and
the proof of loss requirement. Certainly, expenses which are "covered" must be

14

See, e.g.. Couch on Insurance 3d, §81:40 (explaining that a subjective
representation is a promise which is based upon intention or opinion and is not
susceptible of present knowledge; thus, good faith is the only criterion of truth).
15

If "necessary" were intended as a coverage term resulting in a limitation on the
amount recoverable, it would have been defined by the legislature; otherwise the word
invites litigation and inefficiency.
6

"necessary" in some sense,16 but that begs the question of the nature of the procedural
proof of loss requirement.
In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction
between a 'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right
may be established or enforced. This fundamental distinction
between the loss, in fact, being within coverage, and the manner by
which the insured goes about establishing this to the insurer's
satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency . . . .
Couch on Insurance 3d, §193:19 (emphasis added).
The insured has the substantive right of indemnification for "all expenses" which
are incurred for "necessary" medical treatment. The proof of loss requirement, which
must be substantially complied with17 by the insured, exists as a mechanism to establish
entitlement to the substantive contractual right.
Substantial performance of the insured's obligation does not entail a jury trial, it
does not entail changing the opinion of State Farm's agent and advocate (i.e., the
insurance doctor), and it does not transform the injured motorist into an insurer of his or
her doctor's practice of medicine in conformity with the post hoc assertions of the

16

The Court will consider "each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v.
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981).
17

See Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) ("Professor
Corbin states this rule as follows: 'When a contract has been made for an agreed
exchange of two performances, one of which is to be rendered first, the rendition of this
one substantially in full is a constructive condition precedent to the duty of the other party
to render his [or her] part of the exchange.' 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§700, at 309 (I960).").
7

insurance doctor.18 To the contrary, this Court and the legislature have consistently
explained that the no-fault statute was intended to eliminate litigation for the minimal
losses to be paid by the PIP carrier. It is impossible to reconcile the plain statutory
language, this Court's gloss thereon, and the legislature's expressed intent of "no
litigation," on one hand, and State Farm's desire for case-by-case litigation, on the other
hand.
Instead of mandating jury trials for determining the scope of coverage, the proof of
loss requirement is set forth in Section 309(5)(b) and requires that the insured provide
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" (i.e., this answers the
question: How?). After an insured complies with this proof of loss requirement (i.e., the
procedure), he or she is then entitled to receive the substantive right19 of payment of "all
expenses" guaranteed under the contract (i.e., this answers the question: What?), and the
insurer's reciprocal performance of its contractual duties is required within 30 days (i.e.,
this answers the question: When?). The insurer's only defenses are set forth in Section
309 (i.e., this answers the question: Unless?).
State Farm, properly, only requires the proof of loss procedure set forth in Section
309(5) for initial expenses such as ambulance charges, emergency room charges, and

18

It is not negligence to rely upon the advice of a treating physician. Mikkelsen v.
Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah 1988). Moreover, contributory negligence is not a
permissible affirmative defense in a contract action.
19

At the risk of being repetitious, the substantive right is the PIP carrier's payment
of all out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., the risk transferred).
8

initial treatments.20 However, whenever State Farm determines that the expenses incurred
by its insureds exceed some arbitrary and undisclosed level,21 it solicits the second opinion
of an insurance doctor.
The use of an insurance doctor is not part of the proof of loss requirement. Rather,
it is State Farm's unilateral and after-the-fact analysis of the insured's out-of-pocket
expenses under standards extrinsic to the no-fault statute. State Farm's denial of PIP
benefits based upon its insurance doctor's disagreement with the medical decisions of the
treating physicians and its insurance doctor's interpretation of the PIP carrier's legal
obligations22 is an "exclusionary" act.
State Farm agrees that it may not impose an exclusion in the form of "reasonable
and necessary,"23 but denies that its actions are, in fact, exclusionary actions. State Farm
does not argue that the Plaintiffs failed to do or provide anything. State Farm does not

20

This fact gives rise to estoppel issues which are explicit in the allegations set
forth in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at If 52. When an insurer pays prior similar
claims which reasonably induce insureds to assume that such future damages are to be
reimbursed as PIP benefits and subjected to the same proof, a court may rely upon
equitable estoppel principles to prevent the insurer from denying or discontinuing
payments. This point alone requires reversal of the district court's order of dismissal.
21

See MERCY guidelines used by State Farm's West Valley automobile claims
processing center which are attached to Plaintiffs' opening Brief as Exhibit I.
22

See State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693
(Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses' testimony to which [plaintiff]
objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the witnesses tie their opinions to the
requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has established error and that this error should
have been obvious to the court.").
23

See State Farm's Brief at p. 13.
9

assert that Plaintiffs did something wrong after the claim arose and the risk attached.
Instead, State Farm asserts that its unilateral decision to request an insurance doctor's
second opinion permitted it to rest on nothing more substantial than the inarticulate legal
opinions of its insurance doctor and, thereby, to limit its contractual liability. See United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) (explaining that a
clause operates as an exclusion if it purports to reduce an insurer's contractual liability).
In order for State Farm to be permitted to deny or discontinue payment of PIP
benefits based upon the second opinion of its insurance doctors, State Farm must be
endowed with such a right pursuant to a clear and explicit "exclusion, condition or
limitation" in addition to the seven which the legislature has provided in Section 309 (and
which the legislature limited by using the word "only"). It should be obvious that the
word "necessary" contained in the coverage clause cannot be decontextualized and
exported into an exclusionary clause in the absence of legislative action. Nevertheless,
that is exactly what State Farm acknowledges that it does.
Because the physician's treatment decisions are not attributable to the insured,24 if
the treating physician committed fraud or, according to the insurance doctor, made some
other "mistake" (in the absence of proof— not speculative fear — of collusion25), such

24

See Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998)
(explaining that "'[i]t would be 'patently unfair' to allow the insurer to avoid its
obligations under the policy on the basis of information that the applicant did not know,
or alternatively, did not fully understand.'") (citations omitted).
25

State Farm, "by this argument suggests that protecting an insurer from possible .
. . collusion outweighs the legislative mandate to provide mandatory protection for
victims of automobile accidents. We do not agree." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call
10

fraud or mistake cannot constitute the insured's violation of his or her subjective
representation that medical treatments would be "necessary." Therefore, the only
justification for an insurer's denial of PIP benefits or delay of payment beyond 30 days is a
PIP carrier's allegation and proof26 that the insured violated his or her representation by
obtaining medical treatment in bad faith. A second opinion expressed by an insurance
doctor does not have any tendency to show that the insured violated his or her
representation of good faith. On the other hand, a PIP carrier's reliance upon the legal
opinion of an insurance doctor is conclusive proof that the insurer did not investigate,
analyze or act rationally.
The acknowledgment that "necessary" is not a coverage term (but rather, that it is a
collateral representation, warranty or condition) gives effect to the word and harmonizes
each and every element of the no-fault statute. It is consistent with the ambiguity
principle. It advances the legislative intent that PIP benefits provide prompt and efficient
reimbursement for minimal losses. It does not render the 30-day payment provision
meaningless. It does not render the "proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred"
language meaningless. It acknowledges the professed fears of insurers that they may be
subjected to "fraud" or "bad faith" and does not eliminate those valid defenses. It does not
render the no-fault statute's promise of coverage illusory. And it does not permit State

712 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah 1985).
26

An insurer who wishes to debate "fairly debatable" arguments is required to
debate them "in court" or lose its affirmative defense. It is not proper to misrepresent the
terms of the contract, issue naked rejections of coverage, employ intimidating claims
practices, and still profess entitlement to a "fair debate."
11

Farm to receive an unconscionable windfall of $42.5 million dollars per year (even though
State Farm has beat the odds27 and collected its windfall for approximately 12 years
because its victims have, by and large, been too poor and ignorant to fight back).
IV.

LITIGATION IS PROVIDED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
— NOT AS A FORMAL APPRAISAL MECHANISM.

Subsection 309(5)(d) provides a remedy against PIP carriers for breach of contract.
State Farm insists that this clause supports its view that its insurance doctor's purported
"medical" disagreements were intended to be resolved through protracted litigation on a
case-by-case basis. If State Farm's assertion were true, litigation would be the "appraisal"
mechanism28 chosen by the legislature.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the no-fault statute was
intended to provide an insurance process which would be implemented efficiently and
"without litigation."29 Litigation and penalties are only provided to remedy "breach" in

27

See Exhibit E: accord Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991V

28

First, State Farm's assertion would be contradicted by the well-settled
legislative intent and this Court's precedent. Second, State Farm's assertion would render
the 30-day payment provision and the proof of loss provision meaningless. Third, the
criteria underlying State Farm's "test" are so subjective that the "test" is meaningless and
it cannot be litigated. Fourth, State Farm's assertion would contradict its own assertions
relating to the statute of limitations in violation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Apparently, State Farm believes that a first round of litigation regarding "necessary"
medical treatments would be required to determine the scope of coverage "on a case-bycase basis." The first round of coverage litigation would be followed by a second round
of litigation (subject to a 3-year statute of limitations which would begin running at the
end of the first litigation) regarding whether State Farm breached its contract.
29

State Farm relies on Pennington v. Allstate to contradict prior precedent which
discouraged litigation in connection with PIP claims. But see Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration, 909 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah App. 1995) (expressing unwillingness to read case
12

connection with the requirement that expenses incurred30 "shall" be paid within 30 days.
The arbitrary "reasonable and necessary" defense (and its concomitant threat of
protracted and expensive litigation) which is advocated by State Farm (in derogation of
statutory law) has great in terrorem value for State Farm. The wrongheaded resort to
litigation for any dispute (whether well-founded or not) provides an opportunity for State
Farm and other overreaching insurers to impose costly burdens on their defenseless,
gullible, and easily-intimidated insureds. State Farm does not possess its preferred
remedy.31 In sum, State Farm's last-resort argument that the Court should figuratively and
to overrule another sub silentio because "the two situations are so different").
30

By way of additional example, the use of threats of protracted litigation to
defeat contractual obligations in the context of liquidated damages has been rejected. See
Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1993) ("The liquidated
damages provision itself states that the $600 per day will be assessed when 'any work
shall remain.' . .. The contract between the parties . .. considers final completion as
determined by the UDOT engineer. There is no ambiguity about this point.... The only
requirement is that the engineer act in good faith in making this final determination...
. No evidence exists to suggest that the UDOT engineer acted otherwise.
. .. Reliance's argument.. . would defeat the fundamental purpose of liquidated
damages.... These types of provisions are justifiable on the ground that they promote
economic efficiency.. .. Reliance's argument calls for a determination of whether the
project was indeed substantially completed and, if so, how substantial the completion
was. Such determinations only foster additional and wasteful litigation.... liquidated
damages provisions are intended to be alternative resolutions to disputes. . . . liquidated
damages provisions, aside from being compensatory, are valid and consistent with public
policy as an appropriate means of inducing timely performance.... It would
frustrate this policy to allow disputes over substantial performance to render
liquidated damages provisions unenforceable....") (citations omitted) (bold added).
31

The concept of "remedies" is a critical consideration. State Farm claims that the
"remedy" which it "should" possess when it disagrees with an insured's treating
physician is retroactive denial and suspension of future benefits. The "remedy" which it
actually possess, on the other hand, is to report the doctor to the insurance commissioner
or to attempt to prove that the treating physician or its insured committed fraud against it.
13

literally throw up its hands and declare the parties' dispute to be "a question for the jury"
(on a "case-by-case," ad infinitum, ad nauseam, basis) is without merit.
V.

STATE FARM'S VERSION OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, § 11 BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE
AN EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE REMEDY.

Plaintiffs, theoretically,32 can recover their "uncovered" special damages from the
tortfeasor33 pursuant to State Farm's "not reasonable and necessary" epithet. A person
who carries PIP coverage is immune from suit for the special damages covered by the nofault statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197,
1200 (Utah 1980). Therefore, it must follow that the insured tortfeasor is not immune
from suit for special damages which are not covered by PIP coverage. See, e.g.. State
Farm's Brief at p. 28; ROBERT KEETON & ALAN I. WlDlSS, INSURANCE LAW, § 4.10 at p.
419 (2d ed. 1988). The insured tortfeasor's liability in tort for special damages which are
not covered by PIP coverage is not subject to Section 309's no-fault threshold which
provides partial tort immunity (and abrogates causes of action) for "general damages."
If State Farm's mere assertions regarding PIP coverage were rational, Plaintiffs
would sue the tortfeasor, Mrs. Tucker (i.e., Farmers) for the "uncovered" special

32

In addition to the Court's concern for unfairness to insureds (debt and health
problems), it must also be sensitive to the "unacceptable consequences" of State Farm's
preferred construction of the statute. Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1374 (Utah
App.), cert denied. 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in the result). The
Court must also interpret the statute in a reasonable way, with an eye toward the
construction that will achieve the best results in practical application. See Tanner v.
Phoenix Ins. Co.. 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah App. 1990).
33

Plaintiffs explained the impracticality of suing State Farm under its "R&N"
theory in their opening Brief at pp. 47-48.
14

damages.34 Of course, Farmers would assert that the special damages were covered and
that Mrs. Tucker is entitled to immunity. Their burden to show immunity would consist of
showing that Mrs. Tucker carried PIP coverage. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall
1999 UT 33, TflO? 978 P.2d 460 ("tort-feasors who maintain no-fault insurance on their
vehicles are not personally liable for PIP benefits and are immune from suit....").
The burden would then shift to Plaintiffs to prove that their special damages were
not covered under their PIP coverage. This could not consist of simply repeating State
Farm's mere assertion of non-coverage;35 rather Plaintiffs could not overcome no-fault
immunity for covered special damages unless and until they proved that State Farm's mere
assertions were actually correct. In other words, under State Farm's asserted "test,"
Plaintiffs would have to prove that the expenses and treatments were "not reasonable and
necessary" even though they have no idea how that would be proved.36

34

Plaintiffs will seek recovery from Mrs. Tucker for their "uncovered" special
damages if the Court rules that State Farm's mere assertions are proper.
35

Plaintiffs could simply cite and analogize UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305(2)(c)
which provides that a third-party tortfeasor is an "uninsured motorist" for purposes of an
injured motorist's access to first-party, fault-based UM coverage simply by showing that
third-party's liability carrier refused to provide coverage for 60 days. However, this
argument would be frivolous because the definition of a term or the existence of a
procedural safeguard set forth in one type of contract does not make it ipso facto
appropriate in another type of contract. See also State Farm's expropriation of
"reasonable and necessary" and "medical management" from HMO-type health insurance
contracts.
36

"When state action impinges on fundamental rights, strict compliance with due
process must be observed. A statute which affects fundamental liberties is
unconstitutional if it is so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning
'" In re Bover. 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); accord
Skaggs Drug Centers. Inc. v. Ashlev. 484 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1971) (applying
15

Therefore, instead of suing State Farm for breach of contract, Plaintiffs are entitled
to rely on their fiduciary's37 assertions and make it an involuntary co-plaintiff pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 19. Plaintiffs' ability to recover special damages in tort from the thirdparty tortfeasor would depend on their privy's lack of contractual obligations.
Next, if Plaintiffs proved that their expenses were "not reasonable and necessary"
and therefore not covered by State Farm's PIP coverage, they could attempt to prove Mrs.
Tucker's negligence and the proximate causation of injury and resulting special damages.
Of course, part of their case would involve laying foundation to admit evidence of the "the
fact and amount" of damages (which means they would have to show that the treatments
and expenses "were reasonable and necessary"). In addition, because State Farm's
arguments (i.e., Plaintiffs' arguments in this example) are effectively indistinguishable
from "proximate causation," an additional insurmountable hurdle would arise. After the
confused jury "guesses" that the self-contradicting Plaintiffs should not recover their
special damages, Plaintiffs would be left without any remedy.

vagueness doctrine to a civil matter). Perhaps it could be argued that Plaintiffs, their
treating doctors, and their counsel all suffer from a chronic case of small-brain syndrome
rendering them "not of common intelligence." However, it is no answer to say that the
meaning of the no-fault statute is to be "guessed at" by a jury or by an insurance doctor.
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1) which exists "to ensure that the entire
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from
the policy exactly what coverage he or she has." CuUum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.
857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993).
37

State Farm's refusal to pay PIP benefits subjects insureds to personal liability
for the "uncovered," but incurred, expenses. State Farm's misconduct is analogous to a
liability carrier's action resulting in a verdict against its insured in excess of the coverage
limit where the liability carrier had the opportunity to settle within the coverage limit.
16

VI.

STATE FARM'S ASSERTION THAT IT CAN DO ANYTHING
WHICH IS NOT EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN IS ABSURD.

State Farm asserts that the legislature should have expressly forbidden its "medical
management" practices if it did not want State Farm to deny PIP benefits. See State
Farm's Brief at p. 12. It asserts that the "legislature's silence implies that it did not intend
to preclude^8] insurers from" denying PIP benefits based upon an insurance doctor's
second opinion. Id. The Court may not infer a right of delay, suspension, or retroactive
denial where the statute affords no delay and expressly requires payment within 30 days.39
Moreover, permitted exclusionary actions are explicitly limited to seven types.
In 1974, the concept of "medical management" consisting of an insurer's use of
broad guidelines40 and insurance doctors for the unintended, undisclosed and unauthorized
purpose of delaying or denying insurance benefits was not known to or readily accepted by
anybody. In the late 1980s, the business of "medical management" was born. Under
medical management, the phrase "reasonable and necessary" was redefined to supplant the
opinion of the treating physician with decision-making by "gate-keepers" whose

38

State Farm ignores the fact that the bizarre results of its assertions are "in
blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). State Farm made one
effort to reconcile its assertions regarding "necessary" and Section 309's 30-day payment
provision. State Farm noted that Section 309 references the damages provided by Section
307; therefore, it reasoned, the 30-day payment provision does not preclude its actions.
See Transcript at p. 50. This argument is circular, it would render the 30-day payment
provision meaningless, and it would make the statute's penalty provisions toothless.
39

"Expressio, unius est exclusio alterius. " See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 882 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994).
40

See Exhibit I appended to Plaintiffs' opening Brief.
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subjective conclusions are cloaked in the language of "medical necessity."
The recent debate over the "Patients' Bill of Rights" which purports to create better
standards and procedural safeguards for the "medical management" practices of HMOs is
vigorously opposed because, HMOs claim, reposing decision-making in the treating
physician or a panel of truly independent physicians will "destroy medical management."
"Destruction" of "managed care," they assert, will revert health insurance to the
"fee-for-service" regime which existed prior to the invention of "medical management."
The "fee-for-service" insurance detested and supplanted by HMOs is the only type of
health insurance which existed in 1974.
In other words, the Utah Legislature's foresight cannot be presumed to so great that
it adopted the then-uninvented "medical management" regimie when it adopted the no-fault
statute. The legislature has learned of "medical management" and adopted it in the
Workers' Compensation Act and other statutes. Many states besides Utah have adopted
"medical management" practices in their no-fault statutes (many of which are "true"
no-fault statutes). However, the Utah legislature NEVER amended41 the 1974 no-fault
statute to include the "medical management" practices invented in the 1980s.
Simply stated, the no-fault statute does not say what State Farm says it says, but
State Farm, nevertheless, comes before this Court essentially asking: "Are you going to

41

State Farm's nationwide adoption of "medical management" in connection with
its Medical Cost Containment Pogrom did not amend the no-fault statute. The power to
amend statutes is a constitutional power that has not been delegated to State Farm, and
State Farm may not usurp legislative powers for the purpose of unilaterally changing the
ground rules underlying the no-fault statute. This seems too obvious to admit of serious
controversy.
18

believe me, or your lying eyes?"42 The legislature is to set the rules; neither the regulated
parties nor the courts are to change43 them — especially after the outcome of an accident is
known (i.e., after expenses have been "incurred").
VII.

STATE FARM DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY DENY FULL
PAYMENT OF THE PIP BENEFITS TO WHICH PLAINTIFFS
WERE ENTITLED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 18, 1997.

On or about November 6, 1996, State Farm notified Plaintiffs that although its
insurance doctor assured44 it that it owed no duty to provide additional PIP benefits to
Plaintiffs, it was willing to change its decision if its insurance doctor changed his
decision.45 See Exhibit A: State Farm's Brief at p. 21. State Farm invited Plaintiffs to

42

This quote is attributed to Groucho Marx. The idea expressed above fits nicely
with the legal relativism observed by many courts that "there are two sides to every
argument." The unstated subtext of this sacred cow is: "Because the two sides are equally
valid, it does not matter which side the court chooses to endorse."
43

State Farm's undaunted repetition of a "catch phrase" does not render the actual
language of the statute meaningless or irrelevant. If State Farm perceives too many
personal injury lawsuits, perhaps the $3,000 coverage limit and tort threshold is too low
under current economic conditions (including medical inflation) and should be raised. If
State Farm perceives a real need for imposing "medical management" on Utah's
motorists it would be well-within its rights to use its economic might to hire lobbyists
(rather than insurance doctors and defense attorneys). State Farm cannot unilaterally alter
a statutory scheme with which it disagrees, and courts cannot abdicate their duty to
interpret and enforce the no-fault statute as it is written just because State Farm finds that
the requirements interfere with its desire to reap undeserved windfalls.
44

The unauthorized use of "medical management" is the breach of the
constructive promise that neither party would intentionally do anything to impair the
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract (i.e., bad faith). See St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991).
45

"If Dr. Marble does advise us differently than what he has in his report of
October 22, 1996, then we will advise you of that." Exhibit A.
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provide additional evidence (of some undisclosed nature) that might convince its insurance
doctor and, thereby, enable it to provide additional PIP benefits.
Now State Farm asserts46 that the statute of limitations was running during the
period in which it was showing its "good faith"47 desire to comply with its statutory and
contractual duties (or to allow Plaintiffs to comply with the "statutory predicate"). In
other words: "gotcha!"48 This duplicity is not the least bit clever,49 it is unbecoming of a
46

State Farm asserts that "There is no factual record to support" the existence of
the parties' agreement to negotiate. See State Farm's Brief at p. 21. But see Exhibit A.
The need for facts to support its assertions is exactly why its Rule 12(b)(6) statute of
limitations motion based on its affirmative defense was improper.
In addition, State Farm asserts that Plaintiffs "provided no support for the
proposition that a party is precluded from raising an affirmative defense in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Id at p. 26. This is an example of the annoyingly common "lawyer
trick" of distraction which State Farm employs repeatedly in its opposition Brief. See
State Farm's Brief at pp. 11, 25, 26, 27. Rather than attempting to distinguish the caselaw
relied upon by Plaintiffs, State Farm tries to convince the Court that Plaintiffs didn't cite
any caselaw. Plaintiffs, in fact, presented three cases from Utah's appellate courts which
clearly and unequivocally explain that State Farm's affirmative defense was not properly
raised and that Plaintiffs' timely Motion to Strike should have been granted. See
Plaintiffs' opening Brief at pp. 36-37.
47

State Farm may not rely on the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Sittner v.
Schriever. 2001 UT App 99,ffl[15-17, 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 15.
48

But see Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d 22 at 27-28, 456 P.2d 159
(1969) (holding that estoppel was a question of fact where claims adjustor lulled
third-party claimant into understanding that claim was being resolved).
49

See, e ^ , Gassman v. Dorius 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) (Ellet, J. dissenting)
("Thus the arrested [allegedly drunk] person, even while asserting that he is sober, refuses
to take the test which would prove his claim and, instead, imposes upon the time of a
busy officer for hours by claiming that he will take a test which he never does.... It
seems to me that it takes a naive court to fall for that type of shyster trick. It must be a
court more interested in protecting the driving privilege of drunks than in the preservation
of life and limb upon the highways of this state. In addition to this, the courts should
follow the law as it is written. There is no provision in the law for any delay.").
20

fiduciary administering a statutory contract,50 and it should not have been rewarded by the
district court (on its own motion, argument and "discovery," and without review of the
actual correspondence or any other competent evidence at an oral argument regarding an
improperly interposed Rule 12(b)(6) motion).51
A definite denial was required before State Farm is considered to have made a full
anticipatory breach, rather than a partial anticipatory breach. See Plaintiffs' opening Brief
at p. 42. A definite rejection of a claim occurs when:
the insured is definitely advised that the insurer has disapproved the
insured's claim, and recognizes no right on the insured's part to have
his or her claim reconsidered
Couch on Insurance 3d, §236:93 (emphasis added); see also id. at §236:96. State Farm did
recognize a right on the insureds' part to have their claim reconsidered by the insurance
doctor. Therefore, there was no definite denial and the claim did not begin to run until
50

See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Or.. 2000 UT 90,119, 15 P.3d 1030.

51

State Farm did not prove the applicability of any statute of limitations; instead it
simply asserted that it began running on the date of the automobile accident. State Farm
ignored the express tolling mechanism, and forced the district court to argue its
affirmative defense and to perform "fact finding" regarding the irrelevant first receipt by
Plaintiffs of an ambiguous notice of denial. See Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, ^f 14,
1 P.3d 558 ("A defendant's burden includes showing that the statute of limitation
alleged as an affirmative defense actually applies. See Ponderosa One Ltd. v. Salt
Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist.t 738 P.2d 635, 636-37 (Utah 1987) (reversing
summary judgment when statute of limitations alleged as affirmative defense was
not proven).") (emphasis added); see also id. at ^ 17 ("we will not consider other
statutes of limitation that might bear on [plaintiffs'] claim. See also Wasatch Mines Co.
v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 75 n.5, 465 P.2d 1007, 1011 n.5 (1970) (to be considered,
the applicable statute of limitation "must be specifically pleaded"); American Theatre
Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 306, 80 P.2d 922, 923 (1938) (stating "if the [statute of
limitation] pleaded is not applicable it does not avail defendant that the action may be
barred by another section not pleaded" or proved).") (emphasis added).
21

September 18, 1997.52 See Amended Complaint at Tf 16 attached hereto as Exhibit B. And
even if the statute of limitations began to run before a definite rejection of the claim, the
express terms of the statute provide that the limitations period was tolled until the parties
ended their voluntary discussions relating to the insurance doctor's opinions (i.e.,
September 18, 1997). See Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). Moreover,
even if the statute applied to one of Plaintiffs' claims, State Farm's misrepresentation of
the terms of the contract53 was fraudulent concealment which prevents application of the
statute of limitations. See Snow v. Rudd. 2000 UT 20, 998 P.2d 262.
VIII. PLAINTIFFS' CAUSES OF ACTION, BESIDES BREACH OF
CONTRACT, ARE GOVERNED BY A FOUR-YEAR STATUTE.
State Farm asserts that because the relationship between the parties was based on a
first-party contract, all of the causes of action should fall under Section 313 and its threeyear limitations period. See State Farm's brief at pp. 22-24. Not surprisingly, there is no
legal authority54 for State Farm's absurd assertion.

52

State Farm relies (at p. 26) upon Moore's for the proposition that its Rule
12(b)(6) motion was proper because the statute of limitations issue was clear from the
face of the Amended Complaint. The face of the complaint referenced September 18,
1997 as the date of the breach; therefore, the rule purportedly supporting State Farm's
argument actually belies its assertion.
53

The analysis involves when a person should know of his or her legal injury, not
just the fact of non-payment. According to the district court, Plaintiffs suffered no legal
injury; therefore, this Court can hardly impute more knowledge to Plaintiffs.
54

State Farm cites a case that says that form should not be elevated over
substance, but State Farm's purported substance consists of saying "it is clear." State
Farm's Brief at p. 22. A proper examination (rather than a bald assertion) reveals that the
causes of action are independent torts. See, e ^ , Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854
P.2d 527, 535-36 (Utah 1993) (explaining that a statement in Beck that torts can arise
22

Even if the district court's argument and conclusion that the statute of limitations
began to run on November 6, 1996 were correct,55 the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of
fiduciary duty, bad faith, and injunctive and declaratory relief causes of action are all
subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs alleged not only breaches of the
express contractual provisions, but also misleading statements, misrepresentations,
profiting by a fiduciary at the expense of the beneficiary, and wrongful imposition of debt
and legal liability. These facts give rise to torts arising from duties of reasonable care
which arose out of law rather than the contract.56 And even if the bad faith cause of action
from a contractual relationship "stands . . . for the proposition that the same facts giving
rise to a breach of contract may also give rise to an independent tort claim, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, or misrepresentation."); see also Nelson
v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 573 (Utah 1996) (explaining that when one voluntarily
undertakes to render services for the protection of another, the actor also voluntarily
accepts a duty of reasonable care toward that person regardless of whether a duty of care
existed before the aid was given); DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah
1983) (addressing ex delicto duties and ex contractu duties); Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 323, 324 (1965). Moreover, the injuries suffered were physical, not merely
financial. See Sullivan v. Barnett 139 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 1998); Exhibit B at % 6, p. 30.
55

If the district court were correct, Plaintiffs are still proper representatives of the
proposed Class. If Plaintiffs were not proper class representatives, Plaintiffs would still
be entitled to seek substitution of new class representatives.
The doctrine of mootness arises from considerations relating to a party's legally
cognizable interest in the outcome. However, there are various exceptions to the
traditional rules which relate to injunctive relief and class actions. Plaintiffs do not
simply seek money damages; they also seek declaratory and injunctive relief including a
cessation of State Farm's unlawful practices. See Exhibit B. Specifically, this is a case
that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" and there is a "reasonable expectation
that the controversy will recur in the future." See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (3rd ed.)
at §§2.12-2.14 (and cases cited therein). Therefore, Plaintiffs are proper class
representatives even if their personal claims were moot. Id
56

State Farm "misunderstands the source of its duty . . . it is a duty imposed by the
common law of the state." Retherford v. AT & T Comm.. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).
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sounded in contract (as "first-party bad faith"), the cause of action would still not be based
"on the . .. contract of first-party insurance" subjecting the cause of action to a three-year
statute of limitations; rather it "arises from"57 the contractual relationship and is governed
by the four-year, catch-all statute of limitations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3). In
other words, the cause of action is based upon an implied/constructive obligation rather
than the bare terms of the contract, and the Amended Complaint was filed September 12,
2000 (i.e., less than four years after November 6, 1996).
IX.

STATE FARM BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES GIVING
RISE TO A "THIRD-PARTY" BAD FAITH CLAIM.

State Farm insists that because PIP coverage is "first-party insurance," it
necessarily gives rise to first-party bad faith. See State Farm's Brief at pp. 18-19. State
Farm ignores the fact that its self-interested coverage decisions imposed liability on its
insureds.58 State Farm should be obligated to either defend its decisions or pay the PIP
benefits owed to its insureds. See, e.g.. Exhibit C (Bear River's acknowledgment of its
duty to defend its coverage decisions which expose its insureds to liability).
While no-fault coverages are, in fact, first-party benefits payable to
the injured party by his or her own insurance company, this insurance
clearly is intended to replace or augment automobile liability
insurance....
Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:2. Therefore, State Farm's mere assertion that PIP benefits
(like the duty to defend) are generally in the nature of first-party coverage fails to shed any

57

"Under both Beck and Ammerman, the duty of an insurer to deal fairly is
derived from the insurance contract" not "based on" it. Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 536.
58

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs on a monthly basis.
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light on the question of whether its bad faith in connection with refusing to pay PIP
benefits gives rise to third-party bad faith. PIP benefits are part of the broad statutory
scheme to protect injured motorists. Indicia of agency are present in the PIP relationship,
the PIP carrier is entrusted to pay PIP medical benefits directly to the provider, a PIP
carrier's refusal to provide PIP benefits subjects the insured to personal liability for
"uncovered," but incurred, medical bills (typically augmented by collection costs and
attorney fees), and PIP carriers are not in an adversarial position with respect to their
insureds. Because the no-fault statute is not a typical first-party coverage like the UM
coverage analyzed in Beck, it cannot be subjected to a superficial analysis consisting of
only a single similarity. State Farm owes fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs, and its breach
affects the insureds' economic and physical health. Therefore, its bad faith is third-party
bad faith. State Farm has actively concealed its fraudulent behavior and continues to
attempt to justify its widespread fraud and breach of fiduciary duty which is an additional
and continuing violation of its duty of good faith.

CONCLUSION
The district court's order should be reversed. State Farm may not raise any
defenses which are extrinsic to the no-fault statute. This case does not raise individualized
medical issues, rather it raises contractual issues and accompanying tortious misconduct.
DATED this

day of August, 2001.
CARR & WAJDDQ^PS

5rneys for Plaintiffs / Appellants
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of August, 2001, a true and correct

copy of Plaintiffs7 Reply Brief was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:

Mr. Allan L. Sullivan
Ms. Adrianne Goldsmith
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
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Exhibit A

State Farm I n s u r a n c e
September

18,

Companies
State Farm Insurance Companies
West Valley Service Center
2 6 5 5 South Lake Erie Drive
P. 0 . Box 3 0 4 6 3
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4 1 3 0
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 9 5 6 - 4 0 0 0

1997

Trent Waddoups
Attorney at Law
Suite 201, Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Re:

Our Insured/Your Client: Deevoy and Marian Tucker
Claim: 44 966 378
Date of Loss: August 5, 1994

Dear Mr. Waddoups:
Please be advised that we have received your letter dated
August 28, 1997, regarding your concerns.
Again, as stated in my letter to you on August 22, we would be
happy to review any further medical documentation and medical
bills that you have that are still outstanding for the
independent medical examiners review. Therefore, please forward
that information to us in order to have the independent medical
examiner review and advise us if this still would be related to
the auto accident of August 5, 1994.
Please be advised that without that information, i.e.,
documentation and medical bills, we cannot consider and review
further medical bills under our insured's automobile policy.
Therefore, if you wish for State Farm Insurance to review your
client's outstanding medical bills, please forward those bills to
us along with the medical documentation showing how its again
related to the auto accident of August 5, 1994. At which time we
would have the independent medical examiner's review and advise
us how that would be related.
Sincerely,

Julio Sandoval
Claim Specialist
Phone: (801) 956-4020
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
GUESS/jm 025/0918004

HOME OFFICES: BLOnMlKinTfUi

TMTKinTQ A i 7 i n . n n m

Trent Waddoups
Page 2
September 18, 1997

cc:

Deevoy and Marian Tucker
3290 West Hanover Park Drive
West Valley City, UT 84119

STATE FARM

State Farm I n s u r a n c e
August

22,

Companies
State Farm Insurance Companies
West Valley Service Center
2655 South Lake Erie Drive
P. 0. Box 30463
Salt Lake City, UT 84130
Telephone: (801)956-4000

1997

Trent Waddoups
Attorney at Law
Suite 2 01, Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Re:

Our Insureds/Your Clients: Deevoy and Marian Tucker
Claim: 44 966 378
Date of Loss: August 5, 1994

Dear Mr. Waddoups:
I am writing you regarding your letter of August 15, 1997.
Please be advised that we do have the right to schedule an
independent medical exam per our insured's contract or auto
policy. Enclosed is a copy of the auto policy of page 5
indicating under the caption heading, Other Duties Under the
No-Fault Law, Uninsured Motor Vehicle and Underinsured Motor
Vehicle and Death Dismemberment and Loss of Sight Coverages.
Your will note that it states in Section B, the person making a
claim also shall be examined by physicians paid by us as often as
we reasonably may require. A copy of the report will be sent to
the person upon written requests. Therefore, as you stated in
your letter of August 17, that we do not have the right to
schedule an independent medical examination, please refer again
to our insured's contract or auto policy under the no-fault PIP
payments.
If you wish for State Farm to consider any further payment under
our insured's automobile policy, please provide medical
documentation showing how the bills that were incurred for the
date of accident of August 5, 1994, are accident related. Please
also refer the medical bills for those dates of services that
were not considered for payment, at which time I will refer the
medical information showing how the bills in question that were
not considered for payment, to the independent medical examiner
for his review. Once I receive the independent medical
examiner's report advising us whether these medical bills that

HOME OFFICES: BL00MINGT0N, ILLINOIS 61710-0001

Trent Waddoups
Page 2
August 22, 1997

are outstanding are related to the auto accident of August 5,
1994, or not, I will advise you at that time.
Sincerely,

Julio Sandoval
Claim Specialist
Phone: (801) 956-4020
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
JS/tr 021/0822022
cc:

Marian and Deevoy Tucker
3290 West Handover Park Drive
West Valley City, UT 84119

____________
STATE FARM 1

State Farm I n s u r a n c e

Companies
INSURANCE

November 6 ,

State Farm Insurance Companies
West Valley Service Center
2 6 5 5 South Lake Erie Drive
P. 0 . Box 3 0 4 6 3
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4 1 3 0
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 9 5 6 - 4 0 0 0

1996

DEE VOY TUCKER AND MARY ANN TUCKER
3290 WEST HANOVER PARK DRIVE
WEST VALLEY CITY, UT 84119

Re:

Our Insureds: Dee Voy and Mary Ann Tucker
Claim: 44 966 378
Date of Loss: August 5, 1994

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Tucker:
I am writing you regarding the above captioned accident in which
you were involved. Enclosed you will find a copy of the
independent medical examiners report for your review.
In your review^of the independent medical examiners report, you
will find that Dr. Stephen Marble has indicated that Mr. Tucker's
injuries are directly related to the automobile accident, and had
reached maximum therapeutic benefit on June 1996. He also states
that no further chiropractic or physical therapy treatment would
be necessary. Dr. Marble also states that the x-rays taken by
Dr. Howard were not considered to be necessary, since FHP had
taken x-rays previously. There are also other items that were
not considered to be reasonable or necessary for the treatments
that were charged or given by Dr. Douglas Howard. Therefore, we
will be paying for what has considered to be reasonable and
necessary under your automobile policy.
The independent medical examiners report, which was done by
Stephen Marble, on Mrs. Tucker, states that her injuries related
to the automobile accident were concluded on January 1995. It is
Dr. Marble's opinion that the chiropractic care provided by
Dr. Howard in 1996, is unrelated to the motor vehicle accident in
question. Rather, the chiropractic care is related solely to the
patient's pre-existing condition of lumbar scoliosis. Therefore,
you would have to refer these medical bills to your other health
carrier for their review and consideration. We can only pay for
medical bills that are directly related to the injury caused by
the automobile accident under your automobile policy. Enclosed
are those medical bills for your disbursement.
If there are any other questions regarding this matter, please
feel free to contact me. My number here is 956-4020. If there
should be any other medical documentation that was not given to

HOME OFFICES: BL00MINGT0N. ILLINOIS 61710-0001

DEE VOY TUCKER AND MARY ANN TUCKER
Page 2
November 6, 199 6

the independent medical examiner, Dr. Marble, please forward that
information to us in order to have him review. If Dr. Marble
does advise us differently than what he has in his report of
October 22, 1996, then we will advise you of that.
Sincerely,

Julio Sandoval
Claim Specialist
Phone: (801) 956-4020
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
JS/alw 18/1106006
cc:

Delta Health
Douglas Howard, D.C.
837 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Exhibit B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 1 2 2000
Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)
CARR

SALT LAKE COUNTY

& "WADDOUPS

Deputy Clerk

ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT. STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
DEE VOY TUCKER and MARIAN
TUCKER, Individually and On Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

)

;
]J
]

AMENDED

COMPLAINT

;
'

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ;
INSURANCE COMPANY, STEPHEN P.
'
MARBLE, M.D., MA YE HELEN
)
:
POTTER, and FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,,
;i
Defendants.

Civil No. 9 8 0 9 0 7 3 6 9
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

]

Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), Plaintiffs amend their Complaint and hereby
complain of Defendants and for causes of action allege:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs were, at all times relevant hereto, residents of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and both the automobile collision and the contract of insurance at issue herein
were entered into in said county and state.
2. At all times material hereto, Defendant STATE FARM and Defendant Farmers
Insurance Exchange were and are insurance companies transacting the business of
automobile insurance in the State of Utah and both defendants solicit the services of
so-called "medical management" and "utilization review" with respect to the adjustment
of claims made under contracts written to comply with the no-fault statute.
3. At all times material hereto, Defendant Stephen P. Marble, M.D. was and is an
individual transacting the business of an insurance medical examiner ("IME") for PIP
claims and represented himself as a so-called "independent medical examiner" in the
State of Utah.
4. At all times material hereto, Defendant Maye Helen Potter was and is an
individual residing in the State of Utah.
5. The amount at issue is within the Court's jurisdictional limits.
6. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs paid an insurance premium to Defendant
STATE FARM in return for which Defendant STATE FARM became obligated to
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provide, among other things, personal injury protection ("PIP") conforming to the
requirements of the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act as set forth at UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 309 (the "no-fault statute").
7. On or about August 5, 1994, Plaintiffs were injured in an accident involving the
vehicle owned by Plaintiffs and insured by Defendant STATE FARM.
8. As a result of their injuries, Plaintiffs' doctors prescribed tests and treatment for
said injuries; thus Plaintiffs incurred medical expenses.
9. Plaintiffs' injuries prevented them from engaging in normal professional and
domestic work duties.
10. Reasonable proof of Plaintiffs' medical expenses was provided to Defendant
STATE FARM through Plaintiffs' treating physicians and medical providers and legal
counsel.
11. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307 and the aforementioned policy of
insurance, Defendant STATE FARM is and was required to pay, among other things: (1)
Medical expenses benefits for the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical,
x-ray, and rehabilitation services up to the limit defined in the aforementioned policy of
insurance; (2) Household services benefits of up to $20.00 per day for a maximum of 365
days for household services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for the
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provision of household services that, but for the injury, Plaintiffs would have performed
for the household; and (3) Lost wages benefits of the lesser of $250.00 per week or 85%
of any loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity from inability to work for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks {hereinafter referred to generally, and
interchangeably, as "PIP benefits").
12. Pursuant to said policy and Utah law, Plaintiffs were only required to provide
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred and reasonable proof of
disability.
13. The reasonable proof standard only required Plaintiffs to provide reasonable
proof tending to show that Plaintiffs' injuries and damages arose out of an accident
involving a covered vehicle.
14. Pursuant to said policy and Utah law, Defendant STATE FARM agreed to put
Plaintiffs' interests ahead of its own interests (a fiduciary relationship) to the extent of its
coverage obligation, to provide Plaintiffs with indemnification against liability, and to
pay to Plaintiffs or on their behalf all statutorily-required PIP benefits within 30 days of
receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss, damage, liability, or expense
incurred.
15. Plaintiffs' treating doctors provided reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
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Plaintiffs' injuries and proof that Plaintiffs' injuries had arisen out of the August 4, 1994
accident and the prescription that Plaintiffs not engage in normal work activities (i.e.,
physical disability).
16. On or about September 18, 1997, State Farm notified Plaintiffs' legal counsel
that it refused to pay the PIP benefits due to Plaintiffs on the basis of Defendant Marble's
interpretation of Plaintiffs' insurance policy.
17. In lieu of providing the required PIP benefits to Plaintiffs when due,
Defendant STATE FARM demanded that Plaintiffs be examined by a doctor hired by
Defendant STATE FARM and that their PIP benefits be conditioned upon his opinion of
what was "reasonable and necessary." {hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant
STATE FARM'S "'IME' doctor")
18. Defendant STATE FARM mischaracterized its "IME" doctor's physical
examination of Plaintiffs as a so-called "Independent Medical Examination."
19. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME doctor was contractually obligated to assist
Defendant STATE FARM to increase its profits through its claims adjustment techniques.
20. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor did not owe any physician-patient,
ethical, contractual, or medical obligations to Plaintiffs.
21. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor contended in a report dated
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October 22, 1996 that Plaintiff Marian Tucker's injuries arose out of unidentified and
undocumented accidents which he speculated were not associated with the ownership, use
or maintenance of Plaintiffs' insured vehicle or, alternatively, that Plaintiffs injuries
arose out of a pre-existing condition.
22. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor contended in a report dated
October 22, 1996 that Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker's injuries arose out of the accident, but he
speculated that certain expenses were not "reasonable and necessary" subsequent to an
arbitrary maximum medical improvement cut-off date and that certain x-rays were not
"necessary."
23. Based upon its "IME" doctor's medical/legal opinions, Defendant STATE
FARM paid only the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' medical expenses that Defendant
Marble arbitrarily and subjectively deemed "related to" and "necessary" (contractual
terms interpreted by Dr. Marble).
24. Defendant STATE FARM failed and refused to indemnify Plaintiffs and hold
them harmless or to otherwise provide PIP benefits to the extent of its liability coverage
limits therefor.
25. Defendant STATE FARM represented to Plaintiffs that they were obligated to
provide proof of causation and necessity to a degree and of a sort which is not
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contemplated by the no-fault statute, the insurance policy prepared by Defendant STATE
FARM, insurance contracts in general, indemnity contracts in general, or even Utah tort
law.
26. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay was allegedly founded upon the
fact that Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor (one of Defendant STATE FARM'S
many "IME" doctors hired for the purpose of denying valid claims — and paid exorbitant
sums to do so) did not fully agree with Plaintiffs' treating physicians.
27. Neither the no-fault statute nor Defendant STATE FARM'S insurance policy
provides a coverage limitation, coverage exclusion, or any other type or variety of
coverage condition which might permit Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to provide
coverage or otherwise limit Defendant STATE FARM'S obligation to provide PIP
benefits to Plaintiffs on the basis of its "IME" doctor's interpretation of State Farm's legal
obligations under its contract and his professed disagreement with the healing methods
chosen Plaintiffs' treating physicians.
28. Farmers Insurance Exchange was the third-party insurance carrier for the
negligent party, Maye Helen Potter.
29. Pursuant to Section 309(6) of the no-fault statute, Farmers has the ultimate
responsibility (under negligence principles) to pay the PIP benefits to which Plaintiffs
were entitled from their insurance carrier, State Farm.
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30. Farmers and State Farm are both signatories to the inter-company arbitration
agreement for PIP reimbursement (erroneously referred to by both defendants as
"subrogation") which vests jurisdiction over disputes in Arbitration Forums, Inc.
31. Farmers, as a common practice, refuses provide reimbursement to PIP carriers
who provide PIP benefits to innocent insureds based upon its assertions that (1) the PIP
carrier paid benefits that were not "reasonable and necessary" or some similar trite and
misleading pseudo-legal phraseology, and (2) that its liability coverage limit also limits
its separate and distinct obligation to reimburse the insurer of the non-negligent party.
32. Farmers's reckless, illicit and continuing scheme to avoid its duty of PIP
reimbursement encouraged State Farm to refuse to pay Plaintiffs the amount it owed
under its contract because the desired perceptions propounded by Farmers hardened with
every episode propounded in the unsupervised arbitration forum that fit the legal myth.

FIRST CAUSE O F ACTION
Against Defendant Maye Helen Potter
(Negligence)
33. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
34. On or about August 4, 1994 at or about 3500 South 3600 West, West Valley
City, Utah, Defendant, Maye Helen Potter operated her vehicle in a negligent and careless
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manner causing it to collide with the vehicle operated by Plaintiff Marian Tucker and
Plaintiff Dee Voy Tucker.
35. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid,
Plaintiffs have incurred severe, permanent, enfeebling, and disabling injuries which have
caused and will cause pain, suffering, and severe emotional distress all to their respective
general damage in amounts to be determined at trial.
36. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid,
Plaintiffs will be unable to pursue their normal activities, avocations, and employment all
to their respective general damage in amounts to be determined at trial.
37. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid,
Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker has incurred past medical expenses in the sum $5,104.71 and
Plaintiff Marian Tucker has incurred past medical expenses in the sum $5,380.00 and
both Plaintiffs will incur future medical expenses in amounts to be determined at trial.
38. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid,
Plaintiffs have incurred past income loss and will incur future income loss due to their
permanent disabilities and/or permanent impairments in amounts to be determined at trial.
39. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid,
Plaintiffs' vehicle was damaged, and Plaintiffs were deprived of its use during its repair

9

in amounts to be determined at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment against Defendant Potter as follows:
A.

General damages in amounts to be determined at trial;

B.

Past and future medical expenses in amounts to be determined at
trial;

C.

Past and future loss of income in amounts to be determined at trial;

D.

Property damage and loss of use in amounts to be determined at trial;
and

E.

Prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, costs of court and such
other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS
Against Defendant State F a r m
{Declaratory Relief; Breach of Contract, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty; and Fraud)

40. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
41. This claim is brought on behalf of a class (the "Class") consisting of all
persons (i) who were insured under (or who were beneficiaries of) any insurance policy
issued by State Farm (or any of its subsidiaries and affiliates) and in effect at any time
prior to the filing of this action, and/or policies presently in effect, containing no-fault or
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PIP coverage purporting to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 &
309; (ii) who submitted claims for PIP benefits; (iii) whose claims were denied (in whole
or in part) or delayed (except to the extent permitted by Section 309 of the no-fault
statute); and (iv) on the ground that the claims were not "reasonable and necessary," that
the claims were subject to and/or disputed by "medical management" techniques
including, but not limited to, so-called "independent medical examinations" and
"utilization reviews," or that the claims were subject to exclusions, limitations, or
conditions (no matter what State Farm's nomenclature was) other than the seven set forth
in Section 309 of the no-fault statute.
42. Plaintiffs seek certification under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), or alternatively or
additionally, under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
43. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. During
the past twelve to fifteen years since "medical management" was invented for the purpose
of HMO insurance contracts (not inconsequentially, this late-1980s invention and key tool
of HMO contracts has never been subsequently adopted by the Legislature as a
component of the 1973 no-fault statute), State Farm undoubtedly entered into more than
the 20-30 automobile insurance contracts necessary to satisfy the numerosity requirement.
Although the precise number of Class members can only be ascertained through
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appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds or thousands of members
in the proposed Class.
44. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, which questions
predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. The principal
issue is whether the no-fault statute permits unlawful and self-interested claims
adjustment techniques as alleged herein.
45. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of those of the Class members, in that they
are based on the same legal and factual theories and predominant common questions.
46. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
Although their personal claims are not large enough to warrant individual litigation, they
have enough at stake to ensure that they will vigorously litigate this matter. Plaintiffs
wish to obtain redress of the wrong. To that end, Plaintiffs have retained counsel
experienced in complex litigation and specifically claims under the Utah Financial
Responsibility Act (including the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act).
47. Certification is appropriate under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that State Farm
has imposed uniform policies with respect to the entire Class, and injunctive and
declaratory relief against the imposition of the policies is necessary under the state law
claims. The monetary relief sought, including statutory damages, does not detract from
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the cohesiveness of the Class.
48. Alternatively and in addition, Plaintiffs request certification under Utah R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The common questions predominate over any individual issues. A class
action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this dispute. Because State
Farm is misstating its actual obligations, most insureds will not realize that they have a
claim. Moreover, most attorneys will not realize that their clients have a claim because of
the Utah State Bar's ethical opinion which prohibits charging a client for assisting with
recovery of PIP benefits and because State Farm's erroneous assertions concerning its
obligations developed in a forum where there is little or no oversight by attorneys or the
courts (leading many to believe that State Farm's misconduct is the status quo). A class
action is, therefore, essential to prevent a failure of justice. Furthermore, the size of the
claims involved does not warrant individual litigation of the magnitude and complexity
necessary to challenge the legality of the denials of claims.

SECOND CAUSE O F ACTION
Against Defendant State Farm
{Declaratory Judgment ana Injunction)

49. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
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50. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
51. Pursuant to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-33-2, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that neither the no-fault statute nor
Defendant State Farm's insurance contract provides any basis for State Farm's denials of
PIP benefits based upon medical management or any similar sharp practice.
52. Defendant STATE FARM did not rely upon any clause in its insurance
contract when it denied coverage and is estopped from doing so now. Moreover, a clause
which might support State Farm's misconduct would be void under the no-fault statute.
53. If Defendant STATE FARM were permitted to deny coverage based upon the
failure of Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange to concede its reimbursement
obligation and/or Defendant Marble's lack of unanimous agreement with the Plaintiffs'
treating physicians, the personal injury protection coverage under the insurance contract
would be illusory and against public policy because benefil payments which were
intended by the Legislature as an immediate and timely substitute remedy for the
abrogation of citizens' constitutionally protected right to bring a negligence action would,
instead, be a split cause of action and solely a matter of the whims of the Defendants.
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs were entitled to
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payment of PIP benefits within 30 days of presenting their medical bills. The overarching
goal of the no-fault statute is immediate compensation for all expenses for which
reasonable proof is presented to the PIP carrier. No exclusion or condition increases
Plaintiffs' obligations, permits "medical management," or otherwise shifts the risk of loss
from State Farm back to Plaintiffs under the clear and unambiguous terms of the no-fault
statute.
55. Defendant STATE FARM'S asserted basis for denying Plaintiffs' claim is that
it was reviewed and denied by the "independent" Defendant Marble who was chosen and
paid for without Plaintiffs' input and only upon the unilateral decision of Defendant
STATE FARM.
56. Defendant STATE FARM should be preliminarily and permanently enjoined
from denying PIP benefits based upon any reason not specifically set forth in the no-fault
statute and from referring to its agents who owe it significant economic duties as
"impartial," "independent" or any other similarly misleading terms.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.
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THIRD C A U S E OF ACTION
Against Defendant State Farm
{Breach of Insurance Contract)
57. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
58. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
59. Defendant STATE FARM'S failure and refusal to pay PIP benefits to or on
behalf of Plaintiffs constitutes breach of contract.
60. Defendant STATE FARM'S late payment of those PIP benefits which it did
provide to or on behalf of Plaintiffs constitutes breach of contract.
61. A PIP coverage endorsement is a contract for indemnity against liability and,
thus, Defendant STATE FARM'S duty to pay begins at the time liability is incurred, and
Defendant STATE FARM's misrepresentation to the contrary constitutes breach of
contract.
62. Defendant STATE FARM's partial payment instead of saving Plaintiffs
harmless from all legal liability actually incurred up to Defendant STATE FARM's
S3,000 liability coverage limits constitutes breach of contract.
63. Defendant STATE FARM's act of conditioning the payment of PIP benefits
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upon its "IME" doctor's agreement with Plaintiffs' treating physicians constitutes breach
of contract.
64. Defendant STATE FARM'S misrepresentation that PIP benefits were not
payable because Plaintiffs' injuries were exacerbated by "a pre-existing condition"
constitutes breach of contract.
65. Defendant STATE FARM'S imposition of evidentiary burdens and measures
of proof upon Plaintiffs with respect to each and every treatment, bill or partial
application for benefits when Plaintiffs are, in fact, only obligated to provide reasonable
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred which is neither authorized by the
no-fault statute nor clearly and unequivocally set forth in Defendant STATE FARM'S
insurance policy constitutes breach of contract.
66. Defendant STATE FARM'S misrepresentation that Plaintiffs was obligated to
subject himself to a physical examination by Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor
prior to, as a condition of indemnification and payment of PIP benefits, or as a necessary
prerequisite to determining its obligation to Plaintiffs constitutes breach of contract.
67. Defendant STATE FARM'S use of its "IME" doctors to engage in the
adjustment of claims and unauthorized practice of law constitutes breach of contract.
68. Defendant STATE FARM owed Plaintiffs duties of loyalty, among other
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fiduciary duties, and its decision to put its interests before Plaintiffs' interests constitutes
breach of contract.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.

FOURTH CAUSE O F ACTION
Agfainst Defendant State Farm
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
70. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
71. Defendant STATE FARM was contractually obligated to act for the benefit of
and on behalf of Plaintiffs.
72. Defendant STATE FARM knows or should know that PIP benefits are
intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a
result of an accident without having to bring a lawsuit.
73. The no-fault statute and Utah's public policy provides that Plaintiffs reposes
trust in Defendant STATE FARM to pay all medical bills he incurred up to the coverage
limits he purchased.
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74. Defendant STATE FARM owed a duty to pay third-party claims (i.e., money
owed to medical providers for services rendered) and to defend the insured against
third-party claims against the insured thus creating a situation where the insurer controls
the outcome or settlement of PIP benefits, and the insured gives up any right to direct the
negotiations. The insured is fully dependent upon the insurer to see that, in dealing with
claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are protected. This situation, among
other considerations, establishes a confidential relationship and imposes upon the insurer
a fiduciary duty, which means that the insurer must act for the benefit of the insured. The
fiduciary duty requires the insurer to act in good faith and give at least as much
consideration to protecting the interests of its insured as it would in protecting its own
interests.
75. Defendant STATE FARM was obligated to use its ingenuity, influence, and
energy, and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the
health, property and earning power of its insureds, even if the interests of Defendant
STATE FARM were in conflict with its insureds' personal interests.
76. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP benefits did not
adhere to the ordinary standards of professional competence.
77. Defendant STATE FARM'S employment of its "IME" doctors and its reliance
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upon the opinions purchased therefrom in order to justify denial of claims where its
insured suffered actual damages was self-interested.
78. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP benefits was selfinterested.
79. Defendant STATE FARM'S consideration of its statutory right of
reimbursement from Defendant Farmers (because Farmers would have resisted
reimbursement on the basis of "reasonable and necessary" speculation) was selfinterested.
80. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP benefits violated
public policy.
81. The acts, omissions, and course of conduct alleged herein were outrageous and
intolerable in that it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality and said conduct was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages.
82. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct were and
are intended to and/or recklessly allowed to and did cause economic injury, physical
injury, emotional and mental distress and were performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs'
rights under the contract and Utah law.
83. In order to deter such conduct of Defendant STATE FARM in the future, to

20

prevent repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial
conduct uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for its callous and
conscious disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be
awarded according to proof at the time of trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.

F I F T H CAUSE O F A C T I O N
A g a i n s t Defendant State F a r m
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith ana Fair

Dealing)

84. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
85. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
86. Defendant STATE FARM agreed and contracted to act in good faith and to
deal fairly with Plaintiffs when it issued the contract of insurance and accepted premiums
from Plaintiffs; nevertheless, Defendant STATE FARM refused and failed to act in good
faith and refused and failed to deal fairly or honestly with Plaintiffs.
87. In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so and with full knowledge
and/or reckless disregard of the consequences, Defendant STATE FARM failed and
refused to meet its obligations under the insurance policy and the laws of the State of
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Utah.
88. Defendant STATE FARM engaged in and engages in a course of conduct to
further its own economic interest in violation of its fiduciary, contractual,
implied/constructive, and statutory obligations to Plaintiffs including, but not limited to:
a. Arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits;
b. Intimidating claims practices;
c. Imposition of undisclosed, unlawful, and impossible-to-satisfy burdens
of proof and conditions;
d. Failure to be objective in investigating and adjusting Plaintiffs' claim;
and
e. Taking actions that injured Plaintiffs' ability to obtain the benefits of the
contract of insurance and the benefits provided under Utah law.
89. Defendant STATE FARM rendered it difficult or impossible for Plaintiffs to
continue performance and then attempted to take advantage of the non-performance it had
caused.
90. Defendant STATE FARM had a good faith claims-handling duty to disclose
all possible bases for insurance coverage, yet it failed to disclose all possible bases for
insurance coverage and failed to search to find coverage.
91. Defendant STATE FARM acted intentionally and with a reckless disregard of
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Plaintiffs' circumstances and the likelihood that its actions would cause Plaintiffs to
suffer bodily injury and emotional and mental distress and/or at all times acted to further
its own economic interest at the expense of Plaintiffs' economic interest, mental health,
and physical well-being.
92. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant STATE FARM,
Plaintiffs has suffered emotional and mental distress, all to their general damage, in an
amount to be proved at trial.
93. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant STATE
FARM, Plaintiffs has incurred and will incur economic detriment including, but not
limited to, loss of insurance coverage, loss of credit, attorney fees, costs and expenses of
litigation, and other damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
94. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP expenses was willful
and malicious conduct or conduct which manifested a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and disregard of, the rights of Plaintiffs.
95. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct are
contrary to (and constitute the breach of Defendant STATE FARM'S fiduciary duties
owed to its insured arising under) the public policy of the State of Utah as set forth in the
statutes and judicial determinations thereof, and Plaintiffs was proximately injured
thereby in an amount to be proven at trial.
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96. Defendant STATE FARM bears the burden of showing its good faith and fair
dealing relating to the investigation and evaluation that precipitated its refusal to provide
PIP benefits.
97. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct were and
are intended to, and/or recklessly allowed to, and did cause economic injury, physical
injury, emotional and mental distress and were performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs'
rights under the contract and Utah law.
98. In order to deter such conduct of Defendant STATE FARM in the future, to
prevent repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial
conduct uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for its callous and
conscious disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be
awarded according to proof at the time of trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.

SDCTH C A U S E O F A C T I O N
Against Defendant State Farm
(Misrepresentation ana/or Fraud)
99. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
100. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
101. Defendant STATE FARM represented that Plaintiffs was not entitled to PIP
benefits and that he bore undisclosed burdens of proof in attempting to perform their
contractual duties.
102. Defendant STATE FARM'S representations and omissions concerned thenpresently existing material facts regarding the scope of coverage provided by its insurance
policy and obligations of the parties under the terms of the policy, and Defendant STATE
FARM'S representations were false in that Plaintiffs was, in fact, entitled to the payment
of all PIP benefits as set forth above upon a showing of reasonable proof which was, in
fact, provided.
103. Defendant STATE FARM knew that Plaintiffs was entitled to the full
payment of PIP benefits, or Defendant STATE FARM recklessly refused to pay
Plaintiffs' PIP benefits knowing that it had insufficient knowledge upon which to base its
representations to the contrary.
104. Defendant STATE FARM made the above-described representations for the
purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to act upon the representations through ceasing or reducing
treatment for their injuries and/or through the abandonment of their rights under the
insurance contract and Utah law as a result of Defendant STATE FARM'S imposition of
impossible-to-satisfy burdens.
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105. After being induced to inaction and without knowledge of the falsity of
Defendant STATE FARM'S representations and omissions, Plaintiffs permitted their
medical bills and other financial obligations to accrue interest and penalties and
reasonably decreased the frequency and altered the manner of treating their injuries
contrary to the instructions given by their medical practitioners all as a direct and
proximate result of and in reliance upon Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay PIP
benefits.
106. Plaintiffs' injuries were enhanced, their enjoyment of life was impaired, and
other health and mental well-being problems together with financial detriment were
proximately caused by Defendant STATE FARM'S unlawful denial of PIP benefits and
Plaintiffs' reliance thereon.
107. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct were and
are intended to and/or recklessly allowed to and did cause economic injury, physical
injury, emotional and mental distress and were performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs'
rights under the contract and Utah law.
108. In order to deter such conduct of Defendant STATE FARM in the future, to
prevent repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial
conduct uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for its callous and
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conscious disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be
awarded according to proof at the time of trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
A g a i n s t Defendants Farmers Insurance E x c h a n g e & Marble
{Aiding a Fiduciary to Make Secret
Profits)

109. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
110. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble knew that
Defendant STATE FARM and Plaintiffs were parties to an insurance contract under
which Defendant STATE FARM owed PIP benefits to Plaintiffs — a fiduciary
relationship.
111. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble aided and
abetted Defendant STATE FARM in not providing PIP benefits to Plaintiffs.
112. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble encouraged
Defendant STATE FARM to refuse to pay any PIP benefits that any person described as
not "reasonable and necessary."
113. As a result of Defendant STATE FARM'S asserted reliance upon the
assertions of Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and the services of Defendant
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Marble, Defendant STATE FARM made secret profits by retaining Plaintiffs' premium
without paying the promised PIP benefits.
114. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble are jointly
liable with Defendant STATE FARM for the amount that should have been paid to
Plaintiffs in PIP benefits.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Agfainst Defendants Farmers Insurance Excnangfe & Marble
(Intentional Interference with Present Contractual
Relations)

115. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs.
116. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble intentionally
interfered with Plaintiffs' existing economic relations by improper means (i.e., by
demanding and providing "medical management" services in order to attempt to
legitimize Defendant STATE FARM'S breach of contract in violation of Utah law).
117. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble intentionally
interfered with Plaintiffs' present contractual relations by improperly inducing or otherwise
causing STATE FARM not to perform the contract, and Plaintiffs were thereby injured.
118. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange's and Defendant Marble's acts,
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and did cause economic injury, physical injury, emotional and mental distress and were
performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs' rights under the contract and Utah law.
119. In order to deter such conduct of said Defendants in the future, to prevent
repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial conduct
uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for their callous and conscious
disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be awarded
according to proof at the time of trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment against Defendants as follows:
1)

For Declaratory Relief in the form of a proper interpretation no-fault statute

specifically setting forth the relative rights and obligations of the parties and an injunction
against State Farm's future bad-faith breaches of contract based upon its untenable
interpretation of its fiduciary, contractual and statutory obligations;
2)

For the disgorgement of all profits or other benefits accruing to Defendant

State Farm because of its possession and use of capital that should have been paid to
Plaintiffs as PIP benefits under the insurance policy's no-fault coverage;
3)

For interest on the unpaid PIP benefits accruing and compounding at the rate
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3)

For interest on the unpaid PIP benefits accruing and compounding at the rate

of 1 Vi% per month and other prejudgment interest accruing at the legal rate;
4)

For reasonable costs and attorney fees including all litigation costs and

damages down to the time of trial, including expert witness fees;
5)

For the value of the PIP benefits Plaintiffs are entitled to under the insurance

policy in the principal amount of $3,521.00;
6)

For damages arising out of emotional distress, mental anguish, increased

physical pain and suffering, loss of (or injury to) credit, interest costs and penalties;
7)

For punitive damages in such amounts as shall be established by proof at

trial; and
8)

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises.

DATED this /J?

day of September, 2000.
CARR & WADDOUPS

ei

TREltfT J. WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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MATLTNG CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of September, 2000, to:

Maye Helen Potter
1211 W. Highway 32
Oakley, Utah 84055

Mr. Harold L. Petersen
PETERSEN & HANSEN
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

TRENT^VADDOUPS
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Exhibit C

April 5. 1996

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy

UTAH

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in the State of
Utah. Rease read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that it provides. You may call the company
to help and assist you in any questions that you have.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
P. O . B o x 5 7 1 3 1 0
Murray, Utah 84157-1310

The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named
in the Declarations and Policy.

4/96 Ed.

d.

statute as follows:
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses
shall not exceed $3,000.00; unless additional medical
protection or payments are provided for on the
Declaration page, they must be incurred within three
years of the date of the accident to be payable;
Work Loss:
The maximum amount payable for work loss is eightyfive percent of any loss of gross income and earning
capacity, not to exceed the total of $250.00 per
week;
Special Damage:
A special damage allowance not exceeding $20.00
per day for inability to perform services for his
household;
Funeral Expenses:
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses
shall not exceed $1,500.00;
Survivor Loss:
The amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000.00
and is payable only to natural persons who are the
eligible injured person's heirs.

2.

Any amount payable by the Company under the
terms of this coverage shall be reduced by the
amount paid, payable, or required to be provided
on account of such bodily injury:
a. under any worker's compensation plan or any
similar statutory plan;
b. which that person receives or is entitled to
receive from the United States or any of its
agencies because he is on active duty in the
military service.

3.

That where a Covered Person under this policy is
or would be held legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection
provisions of this policy have been paid by the
injured party's insurance carrier, including the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the
Company if it would be legally held liable shall
reimburse the insurance company of the other
party for the payments as provided herein, but
not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement in its amount shall be mandatory
binding arbitration between the two insurance
companies providing for insurance coverage as
herein set forth.

4.

If the Covered Person incurs medical expenses
which are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may
refuse to pay for those medical expenses and
contest them. Unreasonable medical expenses
are fees for medical services which are higher
than the usual and customary charges for those
services; unnecessary medical expenses are fees
for medical services which "are not usually and
customarily performed for treatment of the injury,
including fees for an excessive number, amount,
or duration of medical services.

5.

If the Covered Person is sued by a medical
services provider because we refuse to pay
contested medical expenses, we will pay all
defense costs and any resulting judgment against
the Covered Person. We have the right to choose
the counsel. The Covered Person must cooperate
with us in the defense of any claim, demand or
lawsuit. If the Covered Person is required to
attend any trials or hearings and wages or
salaries are lost as a result, we will pay up to
$35.00 per day.

Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability
and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur
during the policy period in this state, the United States, its
territories or possessions, or Canada, except if an auto
accident to which this policy applies occurs outside of
Utah, {but is within the United States and Canada), our
limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as
follows:
1.

Pan** fi

If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has:
a. a personal injury protection or similar law
specifying limits higher than that in the
declarations, your policy will provide the
higher specified limit;
b. compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain personal injury protection
insurance, whenever the non-resident uses a
vehicle in that state or Canada, your policy
will provide at least the required minimum
amounts and types of coverage;
c. no compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain insurance, whenever the
insured uses a vehicle in that state or
Canada, your policy does not provide for any
benefits under Part B, Personal Injury
Coverage, to non-residents of the State of
Utah, except for medical expenses under this
section, not to exceed $3,000.00;

no compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain insurance in that state or
Canada, your policy does not provide benefits
under this section to residents of the State of
Utah who are not family members in any
amount in excess of the minimum limits as
provided for this type of coverage in the
State of Utah.

Exhibit D

The Honorable James Doerty

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY
MINDY SITTON; JESUS BANCACO; IRIS I
SALTER; RICHARD BAKER; JOANE
ROOSE; and VIRGIE HARRIS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated in
the State of Washington,

NO. 00-2-10013-2SEA
ORDER GRANTING CLASS
CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurer,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER came on before the Honorable Jim Doerty, Judge of the King County
Superior Court, upon the plaintiffs' motion for an order certifying this case as a class action. The
Court, having reviewed the briefs and attachments of the parties, considered the applicable law,
analyzed the prerequisites for class certification under CR 23, and considered the arguments of
counsel, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED;
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The criteria for class certification under CR 23(a) are met. The number of claimants

satisfies the numerosity requirement. CR 23(a)(1). There are common questions of law or fact
ORDER GRANTING CLASS CERTIFICATION - 1
200 Second Venue Hest
Seattle UA9811U

STRITMATTER K E S S L E R WHELAN V U T H E \ C 0 L I C C 1 0

(206)448-1777

present. CR 23(a)(2). The claims of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the class. CR
23(a)(3). The named plaintiffs are representative of the class as a whole and plaintiffs' counsel is
experienced in class action litigation. CR 23(a)(4).
2.
6

8

Q \^J •

In addition, the criteria under Rule 23(b)(1), (2) s ^ M ^ a r e met. Th<&o&?

9nS

s}>gc|fitalj!^^

3.

The certified class is defined as:

9

All persons in the State of Washington who, within the last six years, were
insured by State Farm for personal injury protection (PIP) and who
sustained injuries in a covered occurrence (motor vehicle accident) and
who submitted a PIP claim to State Farm for medical expenses which was
referred to an external medical utilization review, and who were denied or

io
1]

1 2

4.

limited in the PIP benefits by State Farm based on such review.
The plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare a form of order providing notice to the class of

14
15
lb

this case.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

day of ^0 iMMlLh

, 2000.

17

J4T o ^ ^ 7
)N.JIMDOERTY
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

18
19
20

Presented by:
21
22

STRITMATTER KESSLER WHELAN WITHEY COLUCCIO

23
24
25

MICHAEL E. WITHEY, WSBA #4787
Counsel for Plaintiffs

26
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together with a copy of a complaint, as provided in rule 4 or by filing a complaint."7
[5] It is undisputed that Sievers waited
only 59 days after filing her tort claim with
the City before commencing her suit in superior court. She claims it was necessary to
file her action with the court on the Friday
preceding the expiration of the applicable
statute of limitations because the 60th day of
the notice claim statute fell on Saturday, a
day when the courts were not open. She
asserts that if she waited until the following
Monday the applicable statute of limitation
would have run. Given the facts before us,
the argument has no merit.
It is settled case law that final Saturdays
are to be excluded when computing statute of
limitations periods.8 In addition, the Legislature, in 1997, amended RCW 1.12.040 (computation of time) adding Saturdays to the
already excluded Sundays and holidays for
the computation of time when the last day of
the penod falls on such a day.9 Thus, given
the fact that Sievers waited until the last
possible day to file her notice of claim with
the City before the running of the limitation
period, it was necessary to properly count
the days under the statutes and court rules
to discover that the only (last) possible day to
commence the action here would have been
on Monday, October 20, 1997, a date in compliance with the 60-day waiting rule mandated by RCW 4.96.020(4) and within the applicable statute of limitation.

Tina VAN NOY; Patricia Faye Dinnis
(formerly Patricia Faye Burkett); and
Elaine Ebersole; on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY and State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Respondents.
No. 41128-4-1.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
June 1, 1999.
Publication Ordered Sept. 1, 1999.

Insureds brought suit against automobile insurer, alleging breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith claims
handling and violation of Consumer Practice
Act, arising when insurer disallowed personal
injury protection (PIP) claims for medical
expenses more than 30 days after automobile
insurer received the claim. Class action certification was granted. The Superior Court,
King County, Robert Lasnik, J., denied insureds' motion for partial summary judgment
on issues of duty and breach and granted
insurer's cross motion for summary judgment on claims in their entirety. Insureds
Although seemingly harsh, this case is an appealed. The Court of Appeals, Grosse, J.,
excellent illustration^ of the dangers held that material issues of fact, regarding
fraught with waiting to file claim notices or handling of claims and whether insurer's discomplaints on the last day of the applicable closures were sufficient to enable insureds to
protect their interests, precluded summary
limitation period.
judgment.
The decision of • the trial court is affirmed.
Reversed and remanded.
COLEMAN, and ELLINGTON, JJ., concur.
Co I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

7. CR 3(a) (emphasis added)
8. Stik.es Woods Neighborhood Ass'n v City of Lacey, 124 Wash 2d 459, 466, 880 P 2d 25 (1994)
9. RCW 1 12 040 provides

1. Insurance ®=>1863
Interpretation of insurance policies is a
question of law.
The time within which an act is to be done,
as herein provided, shall be computed by excluding the first day, and including the last,
unless the last day is a holiday, Saturday, or
Sunday, and then it is also excluded
Laws of 1997, ch 125, § 1, effective July 27,
1997

1130 Wash.

983 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

2. Insurance <s=>1820
Insurance policy language is interpreted
as it would be understood by the average
person, rather than technically.
3. Insurance <3=>1808
Ambiguities exist if insurance policy language is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.
4. Insurance e»1832(l)
If the court cannot resolve any ambiguity by resort to extrinsic evidence, then the
ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed
in favor of an insured.
5. Insurance <&=*1866
Fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship
exists between an insurer and its insured6. Insurance <&=>1866,1867
An insurer has an enhanced fiduciary
obligation that rises to a level higher than
that of mere honesty and lawfulness of purpose; it requires an insurer to deal fairly with
an insured, giving equal consideration in all
matters to the insured's interests as well as
its own.
7. Judgment <S»181(23)
Material issue of fact, as to whether
automobile insurer fully, timely, or adequately disclosed, through policy terms and initial
notice following receipt of claim form, possibility of retroactive denial of personal injury
protection (PIP) medical claims later than
30-day payment period provided by policy,
precluded summary judgment in class action
alleging breach of fiduciary duties.
8. Insurance <3=>1869
An insurer may not restrict coverage or
otherwise alter terms of an insurance contract with subsequent letters and notices9. Insurance @=>3164
Term "proof in personal injury protection (PIP) policy provision stating that medical expenses would be paid within 30 days of
receipt of "proof of amount due" meant sufficient notice to allow insurer to evaluate its
rights and liabilities and to investigate claim.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

10. Judgment <S=>181(23)
Material issue of fact, as to whether
automobile insurer acted reasonably or
breached policy terms when it failed to apprise insureds as to progress of investigation
of their personal injury protection (PIP)
claims after giving them initial notice that it
was evaluating claims, precluded summary
judgment on breach of contract claim of insureds who were denied coverage after initial
claims payment period.
11. Consumer Protection <£»6
In order to recover damages under the
Consumer Protection Act (CPA), a private
party must prove that the defendant's act or
practice (1) is unfair and deceptive; (2) occurs in the conduct of trade or commerce;
(3) affects the public interest; (4) causes
injury to the plaintiffs business or property;
and (5) causes the injury suffered. West's
RCWA 19.86.090
12. Consumer Protection <3=>6
Proof that alleged act constitutes a per
se unfair trade practice establishes that act is
unfair and deceptive and occurs in conduct of
trade or commerce for purposes of Consumer
Protection Act claim. West's RCWA
19.86.090
13. Judgment <3=>181(23)
Genuine issue of material fact, as to
whether automobile insurer engaged in unfair claims settlement practices or misrepresented its policy provisions, when it failed to
provide more than initial form notice of potential need for additional time to investigate
personal injury protection (PIP) claim, precluded summary judgment on Insureds'
claims under Consumer Protection Act.
West's RCWA 19.86.090, 48.30.010.
14. Consumer Protection (S=>6
Insurance @=»3335
Harm from an insurer's bad faith acts is
an element of every action for bad faith
handling of a claim or violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). West's RCWA
19.86.090.
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15. Insurance <s»3361
Viability of claim for bad faith investigation of personal injury protection (PIP)
claims, arising from delayed action on claims,
was not dependent on whether automobile
insurer was ultimately correct in determining
that coverage did not exist.

record before us suggests there is a justiciable controversy as to whether the insurance
company followed, or breached this policy
requirement.
Summary judgment was
granted in error. The decision below is reversed and the case remanded for trial,
FACTS

Steve W. Berman, Erin K. Flory, Carl H.
Hagens, Hagens, Berman, Seattle, WA, for
Appellants.
Peter A. Danelo, Daniel J. Dunne, Jr., and
Robin E. Wechkin, Heller, Ehrman, White &
McAuliffe, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.
GROSSE, J.
Insurers have a general duty of good faith
in dealing with their insureds. Here, in a
class action lawsuit, the representatives of
the class (hereinafter representatives) have
met their initial burden of producing issues
of material fact concerning the good faith
handling of the claims sufficient to survive
summary judgment. In addition, a quasifiduciary relationship exists between an insurer and its insured. Here, there is also a
question of fact as to whether State Farm
Insurance Companies (State Farm) sufficiently disclosed pertinent facts to enable its
insureds to protect their interests surrounding the companies' retroactive denial of
claims. Further, under Coventry Associates
v American States Insurance Co.,1 an insured may maintain an action against an
insurer for bad faith investigation of the insured's claim and for a claimed violation of
the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) even if
the insurer is ultimately correct in determining coverage does not exist. The representatives have met the mitial threshold burden.
The insurance policy requires a 30-day settlement period, or timely notice of denial, or
reasons for any delay. At a minimum, the
1. Coventry Associates v American States Ins Co ,
136 Wash 2d 269, 961 P 2d 933 (1998)
2. To illustrate the type of claims at issue here
1 Class representative Tina Van Noy was injured in an automobile accident in mid-October
of 1993 She was insured by State Farm with
coverage including PIP and medical payments
coverage first party benefits As prescribed by

The class action was initiated in 1994 by
three State Farm policyholders, Tina Van
Noy, Patricia Faye Dinnis (formerly Patricia
Fay Burkett), and Elaine Ebersole. The
complaint asserted bad faith claims handling,
a breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and a violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act.
Class certification was granted for a statewide class of State Farm personal injury
protection (PIP) policyholders. The claims
were for the medical expenses of injured
insureds that were retroactively disallowed
more than 30 days after State Farm received
the claim.
All of the representatives, and the entire
class, were subject to a number of claims
that were retroactively denied after a medical review was done by or for State Farm.
The allegation on appeal is that State Farm
breached its policy by failing to timely pay,
or in the alternative by not properly notifying or extending within the 30-day period for
settling claims.
In October 1996, the representatives
moved for partial summary judgment on the
issues of duty and breach. State Farm opposed the motion and made a cross motion
for summary judgment seeking dismissal of
the claims in their entirety. The trial court
issued a ruling, without oral opinion or written reasoning, denying the partial summary
judgment brought by the representatives,
but granting State Farm's motion dismissing
all claims in their entirety.2
her healthcare provider, she commenced treatment for her injuries including chiropractic,
physical, and massage therapy A claim was
filed Three weeks after receiving claims for
benefits, State Farm sent a form letter to Van
Noy advising her that State Farm would pay only
necessary medical expenses and that State Farm
may require a second opinion from a doctor at
her expense The letter did not state that State
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Th£ representative claimants received letters from State Farm after filing their
claims Each letter reiterated the particular
policy coverage and that the medical expenses covered must be "reasonable and necessary" State Farm also stated that the
bills rnight be submitted for evaluation by a
professional review board or other outside
independent agency3

The dispute arises over language in State
Farm policies that includes a "What We Pay"
section which provides
We will pay for bodily injury to an insured
caused by accident resulting from the
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a
motor vehicle
1 Medical Expenses These are reasonable expenses incurred within three
years of the date of the accident These
expenses are for necessary
a medical, surgical, X-ray
and
rehabilitative services[ ]
The "Settlement of Loss" portion of the
policies provides
Payments will be made on a monthly basis
within 30 days after we have proof of the
amount due

Fiduciary Relationship

The same section further provides
The amount erne under this coverage shan
be decided by agreement If the insured
and we cannot agree, it will be decided by
arbitration upon mutual written consent

[5, G] A fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an \ns\arer and its
insured An insurer has an enhanced fiduciary obligation that rises to a level higher
than that of mere honesty and lawfulness of

Farm might curtail payment either prospectively
or retroactively or that there was any risk that it
would determine that the expenses as a result of
her healthcare provider s prescriptions were not
necessary It did not ask her to obtain prior
approval before seeking further treatment A
little over five months after the accident State
Farm sent Van Noy an additional letter which
stated that it had not yet determined whether her
care was necessary and that it would be send
ing her bills to an independent consultant
Two months later State Farm notified Van Noy
what claims it considered necessary and that
. payment had been made on those claims State
Farm indicated there was an additional bill from
a doctor and a fluoroscopy exam that were still
undergoing peer review and that the company
would notify her of its decision regarding these
claims The letter did not indicate any procedure to resolve the rejected claims further or
seek additional information This notice did not
indicate that Van Noy had any arbitration rights
under the policy It did indicate however that
if she had anv questions she should call a certain
claims representative Because of this rejection
of certain chiropractic and massage claims Van
Noy became personally liable several months af
ter the fact for these health care claims she
believed were being covered
2 Patricia Faye Dmnis was injured m an
automobile accident on May 10 1993 She commenced medical treatment prescribed by her
medical provider In June 1993 her bills were
forwarded to State Farm State Farm waited for

four months before notifying Dmnis that it was
sending her bills out for peer review and did not
specifically indicate or warn her that these pre
scribed claims might be rejected Seven months
after the accident, State Farm sent her notice
that the majority of her claims for treatment was
denied

[1-4] The representatives challenge State
Farm's claims procedures, asserting that
they are highly retroactive and result in unilateral denial of claims that negatively affect
the interests of State Farm's insureds. The
usual standard of review applies,4 as do the
principles for interpretation of insurance policies 5

3

State Farm later conceded that its policies did
not specifically authorize outside reviews until it
changed its policies after July 1 1994

4

Summary judgement may be granted if there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
The court view> all facts and reasonable infer
ences therefrom most favorably towards the non
moving party when ruling on a summary judg
ment motion Weyerhaeuser Co v Aetna Casual
ty & Surety Co 123 Wash 2d 891, 897 874 P 2d
142 (1994)

5

Interpretation of insurance policies is a question of law and the policy language is interpreted
as it vvould be understood by the average person
rather than technically Ambiguities if an> exist if the language is susceptible to two reason
able interpretations If the court cannot resolve
any ambiguity by resort to extrinsic evidence
then the ambiguity m an insurance policy is
construed m favor of an insured American Star
Ins Co v Gnce 121 Wash 2d 869 874-75 854
p 2d 622 (1993) opinion supplemented 123
Wash 2d 131 865 P 2d 507 (1994)
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purpose. It requires an insurer to deal fairly
with an insured, giving equal consideration in
all matters to the insured's interests as well
as its own.6
The representatives argue that State Farm
owed and violated three overlapping fiduciary duties to its insureds: (1) the duty to
disclose all facts that would aid its insureds
in protecting their interests; (2) the duty of
equal consideration; and (3) the duty not to
mislead its insureds.
[7] Whether or not breach of any of these
duties is ultimately supported, at a minimum
there is a factual question in this case whether State Farm fully, timely, or adequately
disclosed the possibility of the retroactive7
denial of medical claims. State Farm argues
that its policies and its subsequent communications with the insureds make it clear that
claims may be denied retroactively and thus
there can be no issue of improper notice or
failure to disclose. We disagree. While the
notice from State Farm and the policy itself
state that State Farm will only pay for "reasonable and necessary" medical expenses,
whether that notice sufficiently discloses that
State Farm may deny claims significantly
later than the 30 days, without giving additional interim notices or reasoning as contemplated by the insurance policy and the
Washington Insurance Regulations remains a
question for the trier of fact.8
[8] We do not agree with the suggestion
made by the representatives that State
Farm be strictly held to 30 days within
which to make a final decision, but it must be
determined whether the notices given provide sufficient disclosure of the possibility of
retroactive denial when the insurer knows
the claimant is receiving treatment at the
suggestion of his or her healthcare provider.
6. McGreevy v Oregon Mutual Ins Co., 128
Wash 2d 26, 36-37, 904 P 2d 731 (1995) (citing
Tank v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105
Wash 2d 381, 385-86, 715 P 2d 1133 (1986))
7. State Farm uses the word "retrospective" rather than retroactive
8. We are not holding that State Farm is prohibited by the policy's 30-day deadline from investigating claims beyond that period, but find it must
be determined whether or not additional notice
or disclosure is required or necessary

Further, there is a question as to whether
the delay of a number of months, without
additional notice, is reasonable. An insurer
may not restrict coverage or otherwise alter
terms of an insurance contract with subsequent letters and notices.9 The issue is not
one of coverage, but is one of the process for
resolving claims.10
Indeed, a letter from the Washington State
Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC)
to State Farm, with regard to the claim of
another potential class member, noted that it
had long been OIC's position that an insurer
cannot treat an insured equitably and fairly
by denying payment of incurred medical expenses on a retroactive basis.
Contractual Breach of the Policy:
The representatives claim the policy requires State Farm to pay or deny claims
within 30 days, or give proper and timely
notice and reasoning to support a delay.
State Farm counters that to reach this conclusion the class had to prove (1) that the
contract as a whole equates "proof of the
amount due" with the mere submission of
medical bills, and (2) that a promise to pay
claims within 30 days necessarily equates to
a promise to deny claims within the same 30
days. The representatives argue that the
required "proof of amount due" is met when
an insured submits a claim on State Farm's
proof-of-claim form with requisite billing
from a medical professional.
[9,10] The policy does not expressly define "proof of amount due," but a resort to
Washington case law indicates that "proof
means sufficient notice to allow insurers to
evaluate their rights and liabilities and to
investigate claims.11 The case of Reichl v
9. See RCW 48 18 190, policy must contain the
entire contract
10. It is unnecessary to discuss all the claims set
forth here, such as whether the policy allows the
review of claims by outside review agencies or
boards
11. See Towey v New York Life Ins Co, 27
Wash 2d 829, 834-35, 180 P 2d 815 (1947), see
also, Fox v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co, 61
Wash 2d 636, 639, 379 P 2d 724 (1963)
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
ce insureds that a large portion of their claims
Co.,12 cited by State Farm, is distinguishable.
e. was being denied. Although these regulaIn Reichl the claimant failed to timely proo- tions may better address potential bad faith
vide additional proof or information sought
it and CPA claims rather than a breach of
by the insurer before full settlement of
of contract issue, they also support the arguclaims with another insured. In the instant
it ment of the representatives that State Farm
case, after receiving the claim on State
£ breached its contractual duties to pay or
Farm's own proof of claim forms, State Farm
rci properly inform the claimant of progress,
properly notified its insureds that it was in
in
the process of evaluating the claim, but later
*r Unfair or Deceptive Practices—CPA Claim:
failed to apprise the insured as to what was
^
[11,12] In order to recover damages unhappening with the claim. The resulting is*~ der the CPA, a private party must prove that
sue is the reasonableness of State Farm'ss the defendant's acts or practice (1) is unfair
actions in handling the claim under its policyy and deceptive; (2) occurs in the conduct of
of insurance. This should be determined by
y trade or commerce; (3) affects the public
a trier of fact. Whether a breach actually
J interest; (4) causes injury to the plaintiffs
occurred will turn on the facts presented.
* business or property; (5) causes the injury
Washington insurance regulations are in-t- suffered.14 The first two elements may be
structive.13 WAC 284-30-370 indicates that&> established by showing that the alleged act
every insurer shall complete an investigationn constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.15
of a claim within 30 days after notification of
In Doumie v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
a claim, unless the investigation cannot rea'" Co.,16 this court held that for the purposes of
sonably be completed. WAC 284-30-380(1)
' WAC 284-30-380, under which an insurer
provides that after an insurer receives a
properly executed proof of loss, it must in- has 15 days bo accept, deny, or reject a claim
form the insured of its decision to accept or or give reasons why more time is needed, an
deny the claim within 15 days. WAC 284- insurer's reasonable need to acquire addition30-380(3) then sets forth the insurer's notice al information and investigate is a valid reaobligations or procedures if it cannot resolve
" son for an extension of time. In that case
the claim, or a portion of the claim within the court found that State Farm properly
that period. The insurer first must notify informed its insured within 15 days, and then
the insured within 15 days that it needs more again informed Downie a month later what
time to resolve the claim and give the rea-\ was necessary to complete its investigation,
son therefore. Thirty days later (within 45 thus within the 45 days required. State
days of the filing of the proof of loss) if thea Farm did not violate the regulation. Here,
insurer still cannot resolve the claim, it mustL unlike in Doumie, State Farm failed to reagain notify the insured and again explainj spond further after the initial notice of its
the reason for the delay. The insurer must|. potential need to investigate further.
continue to notify the insured every 30 daysJ
[13] At a minimum there is a question of
until the claim is resolved.
fact as to whether State Farm engaged in
State Farm did not follow these notice; unfair claims settlement practices as defined
requirements. After its initial request for• in WAC 284-30-330, or whether it misrepremore information, State Farm failed to in-- sented its policy provisions as proscribed by
form any of these plaintiffs/appellants about: WAC 284-30-350. A single violation of any
the progress of its investigations, until some\ of those sections constitutes a violation of
four to six months later when it notified thei RCW 48.30.010. Under RCW 19.86.170, a
12. Reichl v State Farm Mutual Auto his Co , 75
Wash App 452, 880 P.2d 558 (1994)
13. See Clements v Travelers Indemnity Co, 121
Wash 2d 243, 254, 850 P 2d 1298 (1993)
14. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc v Safeco Title Ins Co, 105 Wash 2d 778, 784-85, 719
P 2d 531 (1986)

15. Urban v Mid-Century Ins Co., 79 Wash.App
798, 805, 905 P.2d 404 (1995)
16. Downie v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 84
Wash.App. 577, 585-86, 929 P.2d 484 (1997)
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"The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the policy should necessarily
require the insurer to conduct any necessary investigation in a timely fashion and
to
conduct a reasonable investigation be[14] State Farm argues that even if its
fore
denying coverage. In the event the
procedures are in violation of insurance trade
insurer
fails in either regard, it will have
practices, the representatives did not and
breached
the covenant and, therefore, the
cannot prove harm or damages. Without
20
policy.''^
]
proving harm, there is no violation of the
CPA or bad faith claims.18 Harm from an The implied covenant is breached whether
insurer's bad faith acts is an element of every the insured pays the claim or not, because its
action for bad faith handling of a claim or conduct may damage the protection that the
insured sought to gain by buying insurance.
violation of the CPA.
Again,
this claim was improperly dismissed
However, as asserted by the representatives, the delay in determining the amount on summary judgment.
The decision of the trial court granting
covered caused economic harm by increasing
personal liability to the members of the class. summary judgment to State Farm is reBut for State Farm's delay, the class mem- versed, and the case remanded for trial on
bers may not have incurred additional medi- the issues.
cal or therapy expenses. State Farm claims
that the only damages for which it could be
ELLINGTON, J., and KENNEDY, C J.,
liable are the benefits due but not paid. We concur.
disagree. It appears that a determination
could well be made that State Farm's practices result in the delay of claim resolutions
that harm the insureds by the insureds seeking a continuing course of medical or therapy
treatment for which they may ultimately be
Michael GIRTON, Appellant,
deemed liable and which they would not have
v.
pursued had they known. There are questions of fact whether the claimants are damCITY OF SEATTLE, a political
aged.
subdivision of the State of
Washington, Respondent.
Bad Faith Handling of Claims:
No. 42333-9-1.
[15] The representatives claim the trial
Court of Appeals of Washington,
court erred in dismissing their action for bad
Division 1.
faith handling of their claims. Our Supreme
Court has held that a first party insured may
July 12, 1999.
maintain an action against its insurer for bad
As Amended on Denial of Reconsideration
faith investigation of the insured's claim and
and Partial Publication
violation of the CPA regardless of whether
Ordered Sept. 8,1999.
the insurer was ultimately correct in deterviolation of RCW 48.30.010 is a per se unfair
trade practice and satisfies the first element
of the five-part test for bringing a CPA
action under RCW 19.86.090.17

mining that coverage did not exist.19 The
Court indicated that it agreed with one legal
commentator who states:
17. Industrial Indemnity Co of the Northwest, Inc
v Kallevig, 114 Wash 2d 907, 925, 792 P 2d 520
(1990)
18. Coventry Associates v American States Ins
Co, 136 Wash 2d 269, 961 P 2d 933 (1998)
19. Coventry Associates, 136 Wash 2d at 279, 961
P 2d 933

Property owner brought appeal under
Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) after city
20. Coventry Associates, 136 Wash 2d at 281, 961
P 2d 933 (quoting 1 Allan D Windt, Insurance
Claims & Disputes Representation of Insurance
Companies and Insureds § 2 05, at 38 (3d
ed 1995)) (emphasis added)
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tion, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond mere reputation. The
interest cannot be captured in a single
word or phrase. It is an interest in knowing when the government is moving
against you and why it has singled you out
for special attention. It is an interest in
avoiding the secret machinations of a Star
Chamber. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is an interest in avoiding the
social ostracism, loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal
and, perhaps, even physical harassment
likely to follow from designation. In our
view, that interest, when combined |63owith
the obvious reputational interest that is at
stake, qualifies as a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Noble, 964 P.2d at 996-97.
I find myself in agreement with the reasoning of the Oregon and New Jersey courts
and conclude, as did they, that the petitioners have a significant liberty interest in not
having their reputation wrongly stigmatized
by the government. I reach this conclusion
because it is readily apparent to me that the
degree to which information is released to
the public about these offenders can have
significant effect on their lives. As the Oregon court observed, ostracism, loss of employment, and verbal and/or physical harassment damages more than one's reputation
and constitutes significant intrusions of one's
liberty. Noble, 964 P.2d at 996. Iftheintru*sion is the result of an incorrect branding of
one's reputation, this is not a trifling matter,
but rather, is an injustice. In sum, I concur
with the reasoning of the Oregon and New
Jersey courts and would hold that before
decisions are finally made as to the degree of
public notification concerning the risk, if any,
these offenders pose to the public, they
should be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Although the majority acknowledges a
feeling of "discomfort" with the "seeming
unfairness" of the process that these offenders assail, it nevertheless sweeps its concerns
aside indicating that the offenders have the
remedy of seeking judicial review by writ of
certiorari for an arbitrary or capricious classification. Majority op. at 571. This, in my

view, is a hollow remedy since it would be
after the fact and would be equivalent to
"closing the barn door after the horse has
been let out." In view of the considerable
interest petitioners have in making certain
that they are not disadvantaged economically
or physically by an unjustifiable sullying of
their reputation, offenders should not have
their risk level finally determined and information about them disseminated before they
are afforded notice and hearing in order to
assure that the information that is released
to thej63iCommunity is not greater than what
is "relevant and necessary" for the protection
of the public. I would so hold. Because the
majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully
dissent.
JOHNSON and SANDERS, JJ., concur.
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|784Tina VAN NOY; Patricia Faye Dinnis
(formerly Patricia Faye Burkett); and
Elaine Ebersole; on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Respondents,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY and State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Petitioner.
No. 68548-7.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.
Argued June 29, 2000.
Decided Jan. 18, 2001.
Insureds brought suit against automobile insurer to recover for breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith claims
handling, and violation of Consumer Practice
Act, arising when insurer disallowed personal
injury protection (PIP) benefits for medical
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expenses more than thirty days after the
insurer received the claim. Class action certification was granted. The Superior Court,
King County, Robert Lasnik, J., entered
summary judgment in favor of the insurer.
Insureds appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Grosse, J., 98 WasLApp. 487, 983 P.2d 1129,
reversed and remanded. On review, The Supreme Court, Alexander, J., held that: (1) the
insurer owed an elevated or enhanced fiduciary or good faith obligation to deal fairly
with its insureds, giving equal consideration
in all matters to the insureds' interests as
well as its own, and (2) factual issues precluded summary judgment on the contract claim.
Affirmed and remanded.
Talmadge, J. pro tempore, concurred
and filed opinion in which Johnson and Madsen, JJ., concurred.
1. Insurance <£=>3359
Automobile insurer owed an elevated or
enhanced fiduciary or good faith obligation to
deal fairly with its insureds, giving equal
consideration in all matters to the insureds'
interests as well as its own in resolving
claims for personal injury protection (PIP)
benefits.
2. Appeal and Error e=>893(l)
Summary judgment orders are reviewed
de novo.
3. Judgment <3=*185(2, 6)
Summary judgment will be granted, after considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, only if
reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion. CR 56(c).
4. Insurance <3=>1866
A quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an insurer and its insured.
5. Insurance <S=>1866,1867, 3359
Even in the first-party context, an insurer owes an elevated or enhanced fiduciary or
good faith obligation to deal fairly with an
insured, giving equal consideration in all matters to the insured's interests as well as its
own.

co.
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6. Judgment e=»181(23)
The reasonableness of an automobile insurer's handling of claims for personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits was a genuine issue
of material fact precluding summary judgment on whether the insurer breached the
contractual obligation to pay claims on a
monthly basis within thirty days after receiving proof of the amount due.

|786Peter Anthony Danelo, Daniel J. Dunne,
Robin E. Wechkin, Kenneth E. Payson, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Steven W. Berman, Sean R. Matt, Andrew
M. Volk, Erin K. Flory, Seattle, for Respondents.
ALEXANDER, J.
This appeal had its inception when a group
of State Farm Insurance Company (State
Farm) policyholders commenced a class action against State Farm claiming that the
insurance company breached fiduciary and
contractual obligations, acted in bad faith,
and violated the Consumer Protection Act
(chapter 19.86 RCW). The trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' causes of
action. The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court, concluding that there were material issues of fact which precluded summary
judgment in favor of State Farm. State Farm
obtained review here, claiming that the Court
of Appeals (1) erred in its formulation of the
fiduciary duty owed by State Farm to its
insureds, and (2) neglected to analyze the
plaintiffs' claims in the context of the entire
class. We affirm the Court of Appeals and
remand for trial.
I. FACTS
As noted above, the underlying action is a
class-action lawsuit.
Consequently, the
events surrounding each class member's injury and subsequent dealings with State Farm
vary to some extent. However, because the
facts relating to one member of the class of
plaintiffs, Tina Van Noy, are essentially representative of the entire class, we chronicle
178?her circumstances.
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On October 14, 1993, Van Noy was injured
in an automobile accident. Soon thereafter,
she began a course of treatment that had
been prescribed to her by her chiropractor.
At the time of the accident, Van Noy was
insured by State Farm. Her policy included
personal injury protection (PIP), which is
essentially no-fault coverage for medical expenses arising from bodily injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. The PIP benefits
that State Farm provided to Van Noy were
described in the policy as follows:
What we Pay
We will pay for bodily injury to an insured caused by accident resulting from
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle:
1. Medical Expenses. These are reasonable expenses incurred within three years
of the date of the accident. These expenses are for necessary:
a. medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing
and rehabilitative services[.]
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 791. The "Settlement
of Loss" portion of the policy stated that:
Payments will be made on a monthly basis
within 30 days after we have proof of the
amount due.
CP at 619. The same section further provided:
The amount due under this coverage shall
be decided by agreement. If the insured
and we cannot agree, it will be decided by
arbitration upon mutual written consent.
CP at 619.
Approximately three weeks after the accident, Van Noy received a letter from the
State Farm "First Party Benefits Expediter." CP at 793. The letter requested that
Van Noy complete an enclosed application
for medical benefits and also stated that:
Your insurance policy provides for payment of medical expenses that are reasonable and necessary. To assist us in
^^determining this, we may obtain a second medical opinion. We may also have
the treatment reviewed by other medical
professionals. Your policy provides you
must notify us as soon as reasonably possible after your treatment begins.

CP at 794. Van Noy complied with State
Farm's request and filled out the medical
benefits application. She then returned it to
State Farm. This was followed by the submission to State Farm of billings that Van
Noy had received from her health care providers.
For several months after the application
and billings were sent to State Farm, Van
Noy had no contact with the company. Finally, on March 28, 1994, nearly five months
after Van Noy first began receiving treatment for her injuries, she received a missive
from State Farm that stated, in relevant
part, that:
Our contract of insurance with you requires that we pay only charges that are
reasonable, necessary, and accident related. For that reason, we will be submitting
the chiropractic and massage billings to an
independent chiropractic consultant for
evaluation. We will be guided by their
recommendations and will pay only those
charges which are deemed reasonable and
necessary.
CP at 796.
Approximately one month later, Van Noy's
attorney received another letter from State
Farm. This letter indicated that State Farm's
"peer review" determined that only a portion
of Van Noy's claims would be paid. CP at
798. The letter also informed Van Noy's
attorney that the "peer review group" was in
the midst of evaluating the other billings
submitted by Van Noy and that State Farm
"will advise you of the outcome." CP at 798.
As a consequence of State Farm's action,
Van Noy remained personally liable for the
unpaid portion of the expenses for her treatment.
II. PROCEEDINGS
Shortly thereafter, Van Noy and two other
State Farm policyholders, Patricia Faye Dinnis and Elaine EbersoleJ^initiated a classaction lawsuit against State Farm. In their
complaint they alleged that State Farm: (1)
breached its fiduciary duty and contractual
obligations, (2) engaged in bad faith handling
of claims, and (3) violated the Washington
Consumer Protection Act. Fundamentally,
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the plaintiffs complained that State Farm
ignored the language in its policies that provided that payments be made on a monthly
basis and, instead, "stockpiles" the bills for
months before finally deciding whether to
honor claims for medical expenses. Answer to
Pet. for Review at 1. The plaintiffs sought
damages for all health care provider expenses that State Farm disallowed more than
30 days after receipt of the PIP claims. All
of their causes of action were based on what
they claimed was "State Farm's practice of
retroactive demal of coverage, effective
months prior to when the notice [was] given."
CP at 30. Pursuant to CR 23, the plaintiffs
moved for class certification. Over State
Farm's objections, the trial court granted
their motion and certified a statewide class of
State Farm policyholders whose policies contained PIP coverage.

the Court of Appeals "erred in its treatment
of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim." Pet.
for Review at 14.1 The class responds that
the appellate court correctly formulated the
applicable fiduciary duty and did not err in
concluding that there was a factual question
as to whether State Farm breached its contract with Van Noy, Dinnis, Ebersole and the
other members of the class.
[2,3] Summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo by this court Hayden v.
Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins Co., 141 Wash.2d 55,
1 P.3d 1167 (2000). In doing so we observe
the well-known principle that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
CR 56(c). Such a motion will be granted,
after considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, only
if reasonable persons could reach but one
conclusion. Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash.2d
491, 495, 951 P.2d 761 (1998).

The class moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of State Farm's duty and
breach of that duty. State Farm responded
with its own summary judgment motion, asserting that all of the claims against it should
be dismissed. The trial court denied the
class's motion but granted State Farm's and
dismissed the lawsuit entirely.
A. State Farm's Fiduciary Duty
The class appealed to Division One of the
Court of Appeals. That court reversed the
State Farm asserts that the Court of Apgrant of summary judgment in favor of State peals erred in two respects in its analysis of
Farm, and remanded for trial, concluding the fiduciary duty it owed to the plaintiff
that there were issues of material fact with class. There are two components to State
respect to each cause of action brought by Farm's argument. First, it claims that the
the plaintiffs. See Van Noy v. State Farm appellate court's opinion could be erroneousMut Auto Ins. Co., 98 WashApp. 487, 983 ly interpreted as imposing a duty on insurP.2d 1129 (1999). We, thereafter, granted ance companies to " 'disclose all facts that
State Farm's petition for review.
would aidj^iits insureds in protecting their
interests
' " Pet. for Review at 9. It also
III. DISCUSSION
asserts that the Court of Appeals incorrectly
[1] State Farm's petition raises two is- imposed a "novel duty" on State Farm when
sues for our consideitation.790 It first con- the court stated that "'[a]n insurer has an
tends that the Court of Appeals erroneously enhanced fiduciary obligation . ' " Pet.
formulated the applicable fiduciary duty that for Review at 11. In support of its arguState Farm owes to its first-party insureds. ment, State Farm points to the following
State Farm's second claim of error is that portion from the Court of Appeals opinion:
1. State Farm also asserts in its petition for review that the plaintiffs failed to present "classwide evidence" of reliance and breach m their
tort and CPA claims Pet for Review at 15, 19
These arguments essentially attack the trial
court's decision to certify this case as a class
action lawsuit Because State Farm could have

raised these certification issues at the Court of
Appeals, we do not address these issues See
RAP 5 1(d), RAP 2 4(a) We also decline to
discuss issues that State Farm has raised m its
supplemental brief because these issues were not
previously raised in State Farm's petition for
review See RAP 13 7(b)
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A fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an insurer and its insured. An insurer has an enhanced fiduciary obligation that rises to a level higher
than that of mere honesty and lawfulness
of purpose. It requires an insurer to deal
fairly with an insured, giving equal consideration in all matters to the insured's interests as well as its own.
The representatives argue that State
Farm owed and violated three overlapping
fiduciary duties to its insureds: (1) the
duty to disclose all facts that would aid its
insureds in protecting their interests; (2)
the duty of equal consideration; and (3)
the duty not to mislead its insureds.
Whether or not breach of any of these
duties is ultimately supported, at a minimum there is a factual question in this case
whether State Farm fully, timely, or adequately disclosed the possibility of the retroactive denial of medical claims.
Van Noy, 98 Wash.App. at 492, 983 P.2d
1129 (footnotes omitted).
State Farm takes exception to this excerpt
from the Court of Appeals decision to the
extent it appears to impose a duty on State
Farm to " 'disclose all facts that would aid its
insureds in protecting their interests
'"
Pet. for Review at 9. It contends that an
insurer does not owe such a duty to its
insured. Such a duty, it argues, exists only
in legal relationships that are deemed "true
fiduciary relationships" such as the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary.
Id. (citing Allard v. Pac. Nat'l Bank 99
Wash.2d 394, 663 P.2d 104 (1983)).
State Farm is correct in observing that the
phrase "duty to disclose all facts that would
aid its insureds" has its roots in a decision of
this court that dealt with a true fiduciary
relationship, i.e., the relationship between a
trustee and beneficiary. In Esmieu v.
Schrag, 88 Wash.2d 490, 498, 563|792P.2d 203
(1977), we observed that a trustee's fiduciary
"duty includes the responsibility to inform
the beneficiaries fully of all facts which
would aid them in protecting their interests.'" Id. (emphasis added). After our decision in Esmieu, we noted in another case
that the fiduciary duty we discussed in Esmieu was that of a "true fiduciary" and

further observed that "something less than a
true fiduciary relationship exists" in the insurance context. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Butler, 118 Wash.2d 383, 389, 823 P.2d 499
(1992). Thus, it appears that the phrase
State Farm assails, which is based on our
decision in Esmieu, has no application in an
insurance context.
We are not troubled, however, by the fact
that the Court of Appeals made reference to
the language in Esmieu applicable to a "true
fiduciary." That is so because the Court of
Appeals merely made reference to the "duty
to disclose all facts that would aid its insureds" in setting forth the argument advanced by the class representatives. It did
not, in our judgment, indicate that there was
a factual question about whether this duty
was breached. Rather, it concluded that
there was a factual question about "whether
State Farm fully, timely, or adequately disclosed the possibility of the retroactive denial
of medical claims." In short, the Court of
Appeals did not hold, nor did it suggest, that
State Farm was a "true fiduciary." To the
contrary, the opinion explicitly states that a
"quasi-fiduciary relationship" exists between
State Farm and the plaintiff class. Van
Noy, 98 WasLApp. at 492, 983 P.2d 1129.
State Farm also contends that the Court of
Appeals erred by imposing a "novel fiduciary
duty" on State Farm by stating that " '[a]n
insurer has an enhanced fiduciary obligation
. . . ' " Pet. for Review at 11. State Farm
suggests that an insurance company has an
" 'enhanced fiduciary obligation'" only when
it is "defending an insured under a thirdparty liability policy, and under a reservation
of rights." Id. at 11-12. Because in this
case State Farm is dealing with its insured, it
argues, it has no "enhanced fiduciary obligation." Id. at 11.
[4,5] |793The lower court's discussion of
fiduciary duty cannot, in our view, be read as
wrongly stating the fiduciary duty that State
Farm owed to the plaintiff class. As we have
noted, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that there is a "quasi-fiduciary relationship that exists between an insurer and
its insured." Van Noy, 98 Wash.App. at 492,
983 P.2d 1129. The court was also correct
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when it followed the reference to an insurance company's "enhanced fiduciary obligation" with the statement that an insurer
must "deal fairly with an insured, giving
equal consideration in all matters to the insured's interests as well as its own." Van
Noy, 98 WashApp. at 492, 983 P.2d 1129.
The latter statement from the Court of Appeals' opinion regarding the obligations of an
insurer is unassailable because it is essentially a verbatim statement of the fiduciary duty
that this court has imposed upon insurance
companies in both first-party and third-party
contexts.2 See Coventry Assocs. v. Am.
States Ins. Co., 136 Wash.2d 269, 280, 961
P.2d 933 (1998); McGreevy v. Or. Mut Ins
Co., 128 Wash.2d 26, 36-37, 904 P.2d 731
(1995) (citing Tank v. State Farm Fire &
Cos. Co., 105 Wash.2d 381, 385-86, 715 P.2d
1133 (1986)). It is not at all surprising to us,
therefore, t h a t ^ t h e Court of Appeals cites
to both McGreevy and Tank to support its
discussion of the insurers' fiduciary duty.
The only arguable problem with the Court
of Appeals' formulation of the fiduciary duty
is its use of the word "enhanced" to modify
the words "fiduciary obligation." See Van
Noy, 98 WashApp. at 492, 983 P.2d 1129.
The use of that word is not, however, problematic because it is apparent that the Court of
Appeals used it to emphasize the fact that an
insurance company has an elevated good
faith obligation "that rises to a level higher
than that of mere honesty and lawfulness of
purpose." Van Noy, 98 Wash.App. at 492,
983 P.2d 1129. We are satisfied that the
2. We note that Justice Talmadge asserts, m his
concurring opinion, that an insurer does not owe
a fiduciary duty to its insureds in the first-party
insurance context, but rather, owes only a duty
of "good faith " We are doubtful that there is
any real difference between a "fiduciary" duty
and a duty of "good faith" m the insurance
context We say that because we have long held
that the duty of the insurer to act m good faith
toward the insured is the same as the fiduciary
relationship that the insurer has to the insured
See Tank v State Farm Fire & Cos Co, 105
Wash 2d 381, 385, 715 P 2d 1133 (1986) ("The
duty to act m good faith or liability for acting in
bad faith generally refers to the same obligation
the fiduciary relationship existing between
the insurer and insured ")
Even assuming, however, that there is a difference between a "fiduciary" duty and a duty of
"good faith" m the insurance context, we dis-

reference to "enhanced fiduciary obligation"
was not made to impose a novel fiduciary
duty on State Farm. A comparison of this
court's discussion of an insurance compan}^
fiduciary obligation in Tank and the Court of
Appeals statement in Van Noy leads us to
this conclusion. In Tank, we noted that:
an insurance company's duty of good faith
rises to an even higher level than that of
honesty and lawfulness of purpose toward
it policyholders: an insurer must deal fairly with an insured, giving equal consideration in all matters to the insured's interests.
Tank, 105 Wash.2d at 386, 715 P.2d 1133.
As the excerpt from Tank illustrates, an
insurance company has an elevated or "enhanced" duty of good faith which requires it
to "deal fairly" giving "equal consideration"
to its insureds. In sum, we believe that it is
this duty of fair dealing and equal consideration that the Court of Appeals was referring
to when it made the statement to which State
Farm takes exception.
We hold that the Court of Appeals did not
err in its formulation of the applicable fiduciary duty that an insurer owes to its insured. That duty, as has been described by
the courts of this state on several occasions,
is a duty to exercise a high standard of good
faith which obligates it to deal fairly and give
"equal consideration" in all matters to the
insured's interests. The Court of Appeals
did not stray from that definition and, therefore, there was no error in its | resformulation
agree with the notion that an insurer has only a
duty of "good faith," and not a "fiduciary" duty,
to its insureds m the first-party insurance context We note in this regard that we have stated
"[Tjhe fiduciary relationship existing between insurer and insured
exists not only as a result
of the contract between insurer and insured, but
because of the high stakes involved for both
parties to an insurance contract and the elevated
level of trust underlying insureds' dependence on
their insurers " Tank, 105 Wash 2d at 385, 715
P 2d 1133 This dependence and heightened level of trust exists not only where the insurer and
the insured's interests are aligned, as in the
third-party context, but also, and perhaps even
more so, in the first-party context, where the
insurer's interests might be opposed to the insured's and the insured is particularly vulnerable
and dependent on the insurer's honesty and good
faith
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of the applicable fiduciary duty that State
Farm owes to the plaintiff class.
B. Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim
[6] State Farm also contends that the
Court of Appeals neglected to analyze the
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim in the
class context. More specifically, it suggests
that the court erred in distinguishing the
Court of Appeals case of Reichl v State
Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Wash.App. 452,
880 P.2d 558 (1994), in its analysis of plaintiffs' contract claims.
The plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is
based on the language in the insurance policy
that states "[pjayments will be made on a
monthly basis within 30 days after we have
proof of the amount due." The class contends that this language obligated State
Farm to pay or deny claims within 30 days of
receipt of medical bills or, at minimum, provide "sufficient disclosure of the possibility of
retroactive denial." Answer to Pet. for Review at 15. State Farm argues that the
Court of Appeals failed to follow the Reichl
opinion, suggesting that it is a case where
the court was "confronted with precisely the
same policy language" we have here. Pet.
for Review at 14. According to State Farm,
the Court of Appeals, Division Two, held in
Reichl that " 'proof of the amount due'" is
not equivalent with " 'submission of medical
bills.'" Id. It argues, therefore, that it was
not in breach of the insurance contract when
it failed to pay the claims within 30 days
after it received medical bills from its insured.
We find ourselves in agreement with the
Court of Appeals that Reichl is distinguishable from the present case. In that case, the
plaintiff sought damages from her insurance
company for delay in payment of her medical
bills. The Court of Appeals concluded there
that delay damages were not justified under
the evidence because the plaintiff had failed
to timely provide additional proof or information sought by the insurer before fully settling her claims 1796against the tortfeasor. In
other words, because the plaintiff m Reichl
* Justice Philip Talmadge is serving as a justice pro
tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to

was partially at fault for any delay in processing the claims, damages were not available to her.
Here, unlike the situation in Reichl the
issue of who is responsible for the delay is
not material to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. The plaintiffs claim that State
Farm breached the contractual agreement
because it failed to "provide[ ] sufficient disclosure of possibility of the retroactive denial." Answer to Pet. for Review at 15. The
contractual issue, therefore, revolves around
the reasonableness of State Farm's action in
handling the claims that were presented to it.
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed,
that issue should be resolved by a trier of
fact.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we are satisfied that the
Court of Appeals properly defined the scope
of State Farm's fiduciary duty in this case.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the
Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. We,
therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals determination that the decision of the trial court
granting summary judgment to State Farm
should be reversed.
SMITH, SANDERS, IRELAND,
BRIDGE, JJ., and GUY, J.P.T., concur.
TALMADGE, J.* (concurring).
While I agree with the majority this case
should be remanded for trial, I write separately because of the majority's imprecise
formulation of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's (State Farm) duty
to its insureds.
As the majority notes, the Court of Appeals spoke in terms of an "enhanced" fiduciary duty owed by State Farm to its insureds- The Court of Appeals' formulation
of this duty implied the insurer was essentially a true fiduciary toj^its insured. The
majority correctly disagrees with that formuConst art IV, § 2(a) (amend 38)
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other. One's guard is down. One is trustlation of the duty owed by insurers to ining another to take actions on one's behalf.
sureds.1
Under such circumstances, to violate a
In the most basic sense, a fiduciary duty
trust is to violate grossly the expectations
arises out of a trust relationship:
of the person reposing the trust. Because
A leading authority defines a fiduciary
of this, the law creates a special status for
as "a person having a duty, created by his
fiduciaries, imposing duties of loyalty, care,
undertaking, to act primarily for the beneand full disclosure upon them. One can
fit of another in matters connected with his
call this the fiduciary principle. To recogundertaking." The usual expectation,
nize such duties and enforce a reasonable
based on the nature of the relationship, is
expectation of trust, requiring a person
that a fiduciary will discharge this undergranted the trust of another to honor and
taking to act on behalf of another in a
respect that trust is both understandable
selfless manner and will indeed act "priand of utmost importance.
marily" for the benefit of the other, which J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduincludes keeping J798the interests of the ciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Barother foremost in mind (through loyalty gain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54
and full disclosure) and acting with care. Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 439, 441-42 (1997) (foot2
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship notes omitted).
of trust, which necessarily involves vulnerIn our cases, we have held the utmost
ability for the party reposing trust in an- duty, placing the interest of the person to
1. This confusion regarding the duty of an insurer
to an insured is entirely understandable. As a
commentator noted:
The characterization of an insurer's responsibility as "fiduciary" is neither analytically
precise nor functionally helpful. In fact, the
courts' use of the term "fiduciary" in insurance cases has been muddled and confusing.
As early as 1960, the Washington Supreme
Court characterized an insurer's duty of good
faith as one that "springs from a fiduciary
relationship." In Tank v. State Farm Fire &
Cos. Co., the court continued to characterize
the insurer-insured relationship as fiduciary in
nature. However, in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Butler, the court subsequendy stated that it had
always been "clear" from the "language" of
Tank that it was not a "true" fiduciary relationship. After reconsidering its earlier characterization of the insurer-insured relationship,
the court in Butler has offered the conceptually
murky characterization that the relationship
between an insurer and its insured has "fiduciary aspects," but is "something less" than a
true fiduciary relationship.
More recently, the Supreme Court has improperly characterized the insurer-insured relationship as one that involves even more than
a normal fiduciary relationship. In McGreevy
v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., the court referred to
the relationship as a "special fiduciary relationship" and an "enhanced fiduciary obligation."
Of more practical benefit are the specific
standards imposed by WAC 284-30-300 et seq.
and the general analytical tools formulated in
Tank for the evaluation of whether an insurer
complied with its good-faith duties. Characterizing the duty is far less important than
defining, at least in general terms, what that

duty requires. An insurer must know the extent to which it can weigh its legitimate interests against those of its insured. Without such
guidance, an insurer cannot properly determine how to resolve the various problems that
it will face in discharging its obligations.
In Tank and Butler, the court defined the
weight that an insurer must give to its insured's
interests. The standard that an insurer must
follow is both simple and conceptually clear:
"[A]n insurer must deal fairly widi an insured,
giving equal consideration in all matters to the
insured's interests." An insurer is not obligated to subjugate its own legitimate interests to
the interests of its^ insured.
Thomas V. Harris, Washington Insurance Law
§ 2.2 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
2. The duty of a fiduciary to his beneficiary is
essentially that of a trustee. A fiduciary "is
bound to act m the highest good faith toward his
beneficiary" and he may never seek to gain an
advantage over his beneficiary by any means. A
fiduciary must give priority to his beneficiary's
best interest whenever he acts on the beneficiary's behalf. A fiduciary owes his beneficiary a
duty of undivided loyalty, meaning that a fiduciary cannot abandon or stray from this relationship
to further his own interests. Examples of fiduciary relationships include "an attorney for a
client, a corporate director or officer for the
corporation or its shareholders, an agent for the
principal, a guardian for the ward, a bailee for
the bailor, a partner for the other partners, joint
venturers for one another, and a physician for
his patient."
Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are
Not Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 88 Ky. L.J. 1, 2
(2000) (footnotes omitted).
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whom the duty is owed above that of the
fiduciary's personal interest, is owed only in
the context of a "true" fiduciary relationship
like trustee/beneficiary. Esmieu v. Schrag,
88 Wash.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977). This
"true" fiduciary duty does not exist in the
insurance setting. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Butler, 118 Wash.2d 383, 389, 823 P.2d 499
(1992). But we have imposed a lesser fiduciary duty where the insurer defends an
inj5ured799 under a reservation of rights. In
Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105
Wash.2d 381, 385-86, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986),
we described this duty as follows:
Such a relationship exists not only as a
result of the contract between the insurer
and insured, but because of the high stakes
involved for both parties to an insurance
contract and the elevated level of trust
underlying insureds' dependence on their
insurers. This fiduciary relationship, as
the basis of an insurer's duty of good faith,
implies more than the "honesty and lawfulness of purpose" which comprises a standard definition of good faith. It implies "a
broad obligation of fair dealing", and a
responsibility to give "equal consideration"
to the insured's interests. Thus, an insurance company's duty of good faith rises to
an even higher level than that of honesty
and lawfulness of purpose toward its policyholders: an insurer must deal fairly with
an insured, giving equal consideration in
. all matters to the insured's interests.
This duty in the third party context is
entirely understandable. The insurer is simultaneously defending the insured against a
lawsuit by a third party under the insurance
policy's duty to defend/duty to indemnify and
litigating issues of coverage with the insured.
The potential for an insurer's conflicting loyalties and financial interests is manifest and
our crafting of a fiduciary duty owed by
insurers to insureds is entirely sensible.
But the duty owed by an insurer to an
insured in the first-party insurance setting is
an entirely different matter and the majority's formulation of the "fiduciary" duty owed
by the insurer to the insured in the firstparty insurance context is imprecise. It is
difficult to understand how an insurer can be
a fiduciary to its insured when there is a

conflict regarding a claim. This is not like
the circumstance in a reservation of rights
situation described in Tank. As one commentator noted:
The relationship between a first-party
insurer and its policyholder is ill-suited for
fiduciary controls. Indeed, fiduciary theory simply does not work here for at least
two reasons. First and foremost, an insurer's interests and an insured's interests
Isooare not aligned when the insured is
claiming on his own behalf, as they are in
third-party cases where insurer and insured face a common adversary. The insurer is never cast as the insured's agent.
The insurer and insured do not deal in
trust when a first-party claim is made;
here they are adversaries. Even when a
claim is clearly covered, the insurer and
insured may disagree over the amount due
or the nature of the benefits to be paid.
This inherent conflict, which is well-recognized in insurance law, cannot be reconciled with the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
Second, there is no conceivable set of
circumstances in which the insured surrenders control of litigation in which it is a
party to the insurer. In the first-party
context, any litigation is the product of
either the insured or the insurer suing the
other. Regardless, the insured controls
the litigation.
Richmond, supra, at 20 (footnotes omitted).
We have discussed the duty owed by firstparty insurers to insureds as one of good
faith. Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins.
Co., 136 Wash.2d 269, 961 P.2d 933 (1998).
Good faith is the proper analytical focus for
first-party insurance because the relationship
between a first-party insurer and insured
does not involve a fiduciary duty, enhanced,
limited, or otherwise.
The more precise formulation of the duty
owed by the insurer carrier to the insured is
that of good faith, rather than a fiduciary
duty. This duty of good faith permeates
Washington's Insurance Code. For example,
RCW 48.01.030 defines the public interest in
insurance:
The business of insurance is one affected
by the public interest, requiring that all
persons be actuated by good faith, abstain
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from deception, and practice honesty and App. 69, 977 P.2d 668, affirmed. On grant of
equity in all insurance matters. Upon the Department's petition for discretionary reinsurer, the insured, their providers, and view, the Supreme Court, Bridge, J., held
their representatives rests the duty of pre- that health care premiums should have been
serving inviolate the integrity of insurance. included when calculating claimant's wages.
See also WAC 284-30 (fair claims handling).
Affirmed as modified and remanded.
Under this duty of good faith, in the firstTalmadge, J. pro tempore, filed a disparty insurance setting, the [goiinsurer must
deal fairly with its insured m the claim con- senting opinion. Guy, J. pro tempore, filed an
text of a claim and must give equal consider- opinion concurring in dissent in which Madation to the interests of the insured in han- sen, J., concurred.
dling a claim.
While I agree with the majority's disposi1. Appeal and Error <3=>893(1)
tion of this case, the stronger analytical anStatutory construction is a question of
chor for the majority's approach to the relationship between first-party insurers and law and is reviewed de novo.
insureds in claims handling will be found in
the duty of good faith expressed in Wash- 2. Statutes <3=>181(1)
The primary goal of statutory construcington's Insurance Code rather than the
more amorphous and inappropriate formula- tion is to carry out legislative intent.
tion of a fiduciary relationship.
3. Statutes ©=>190
JOHNSON, J., and MADSEN, J., concur.

If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its
meaning must be primarily derived from the
language itself.
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DAVIS, J.
This is an appeal from county court in which the court
certified

the

importance:

following

question

as

one

of

great

public

IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER MEDICAL BENEFITS IN A LAWSUIT
UNDER SECTION 627.736, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE THE
ONLY DEFENSE BY AN INSURER IS THAT THE MEDICAL
TREATMENT WAS NOT RELATED, NOT REASONABLE AND/OR NOT
NECESSARY, MUST AN INSURER OBTAIN THE REPORT REQUIRED
UNDER
SECTION
627.736(7),
FLORIDA
STATUTES,
CONSTITUTING "REASONABLE PROOF" WITHIN THIRTY (30)
DAYS OF RECEIVING WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE FACT OF A
COVERED LOSS AND OF THE AMOUNT OF SAME BEFORE IT CAN
DEFEND ON THE BASIS THAT THE MEDICAL BILLS ARE NOT
REASONABLE, NOT RELATED AND/OR NOT NECESSARY?
We answer the question

in the negative and certify direct

conflict with Perez v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 746
So.

2d

1123

(Fla.

3d

DCA

1999),

review

granted.

United

Automobile Insurance Company v. Rodriguez, 767 So. 2d 464 (Fla.
2000).

Appellee, Karen Jones (Jones) , was involved in an automobile
accident on or about October 19, 1996.

At the time of the

accident, Jones had in full force and effect a policy of
personal injury protection insurance with Appellant, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm).
1996,

Jones

chiropractic

began

treating

physician

with

with

Bayou

Gerald

In December

Chernekoff,

Chiropractic.

a

Bayou

Chiropractic referred Jones to Nu-Best Diagnostics for a motion
x-ray of the cervical spine on January 13, 1998.

State Farm

received the bill for the cost of the x-ray ($650) on January
26, 1998.

On or about February 5, 1998, State Farm sent the

motion x-ray records to Joseph Costello, Jr., D.C., for his
2

review and determination of medical necessity.

State Farm did

not receive an opinion from Dr. Costello until March 31, 1998,
who indicated

that the testing was not necessary.

It is

undisputed that the bill from Nu-Best diagnostics was not paid
within thirty days of its receipt by State Farm, nor was a
report obtained by State Farm within that thirty-day period.
Jones filed a complaint against State Farm, alleging that
State

Farm

had

failed

to pay

bills

submitted

by

Nu-Best

diagnostics which were incurred as a result of her automobile
accident. She filed a motion for summary judgment based in part
on the ground that State Farm failed to obtain its report within
thirty days of notice of the loss and therefore, State Farm was
without any defense as to the claim for payment of the Nu-Best
diagnostics bill.

The trial court entered a stipulated summary

final judgment in favor of Jones, certifying the question as
stated above, which this court accepted as one of great public
importance.
Section 627.736 (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), provides
in part:
BENEFITS; WHEN DUE.- Benefits due from an insurer
under ss. 627.730-627.7405 shall be primary, . . . .
(b) Personal injury protection insurance benefits paid
pursuant to this section shall be overdue if not paid
within 30 days after the insurer is furnished written
notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount
of same. . . . However, any payment shall not be
3

deemed overdue when the insurer has reasonable proof
to establish that the insurer is not responsible for
the payment, notwithstanding that written notice has
been furnished to the insurer.
(c) All overdue payments shall bear simple interest at
the rate of 10 percent per year.
Section 627.736(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), provides in
part :
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF INJURED PERSON;
REPORTS.
(a) Whenever the mental or physical condition of an
injured person covered by personal injury protection
is material to any claim that has been or may be made
for past or future personal injury protection
insurance benefits, such person shall, upon the
request of an insurer, submit to mental or physical
examination by a physician or physicians. . . .
An
insurer may not withdraw payment of a treating
physician without the consent of the injured person
covered by the personal injury protection, unless the
insurer first obtains a report by a physician licensed
under the same chapter as the treating physician whose
treatment authorization is sought to be withdrawn,
stating that treatment was not reasonable, related, or
necessary.
In response to a substantially similar certified question,
the Fourth District held:
We interpret section 627.736(4) to mean that if
PIP benefits are payable, they are due within thirty
days after notice. If the insurer has refused to pay
the bill within thirty days and does not have
reasonable proof to establish that it is not
responsible, then the insurer is liable for ten
percent interest when the bill is paid. Failing to
obtain proof that it is not responsible for payment,
however, does not deprive the insurer of its right to
contest payment.
4

AIU Ins. Co. V. Daidone. 760 So. 2d 1110, 1112-13 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000) . The Fourth District reasoned that the thirty-day period
only applied to benefits which were reasonable and necessary as
a result of the accident.

Id. at 1112.

It concluded that if

benefits were not actually due, they could not be overdue. Id.
The Fourth District certified conflict with the Third Districts
opinion in Perez.
The Fifth District has also held that an insurer's failure
to pay

a claim without

reasonable proof

that

it was not

responsible for the bill exposes it to the statutory penalties
of an overdue bill, but does not cause it to lose its right to
contest the claim.

Jones v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,

694 So. 2d 165, 166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
In conflict with these holdings, the Third District held in
Perez

that

because

the

insurer

did

not

obtain

a

report

constituting reasonable proof that it was not responsible for
the bills within thirty days of notice of the claim, it was
responsible for the claim plus the accrued interest, and could
not defend on the basis that the bills were not reasonable, not
related and/or not necessary.

Perez. 746 So. 2d at 1125-26.

The Third District based its decision on the opinion of Fortune
Insurance Company v. Pacheco, 695 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ,
in which it stated:

5

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. The
insurance company has thirty days in which to verify
the claim after receipt of an application for
benefits.
There is no provision in the statute to
toll this time limitation. The burden is clearly upon
the insurer to authenticate the claim within the
statutory time period. To rule otherwise would render
the recently enacted "no fault" insurance statute a
"no-pay" plan - a result we are sure was not intended
by the legislature.
Pacheco, 695 So. 2d at 395

(emphasis in original)

(quoting

Dunmore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502, 502 (Fla.
1st DCA 1974)).

The court in Pacheco also held

that "once an

insurer receives notice of a loss and medical expenses, it must
pay

within

thirty

days,

unless

pursuant

to

section

627.736(4)(b), it has obtained reasonable proof to believe that
it is not responsible for the payment."
by

the

Fourth

District,

both

Id.

Dunmore

However, as noted
and

Pacheco

are

distinguishable, in that in both cases it was not disputed that
benefits were owed.
Except
1996),

Daidone, 760 So. 2d at 1112.

for section 627.736(8), Florida Statutes

"which

provides

627.736 (4) (c) , Florida

for

attorney!s

Statutes

fees,

(Supp. 1996),

(Supp.
section

is

the

only

penalty specified by the legislature for an insurer failing to
pay

a

claim

or

obtain

reasonable

proof

that

it

is

not

responsible within thirty days of notice of the claim under
section 627.736, Florida Statutes

6

(Supp. 1996).

The plain

language of section 627.736(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996),
requires only that the insurer pay the claim within thirty days
or have reasonable proof that the insurer is not responsible for
payment; if an insurer refuses to pay or obtain reasonable
proof, it is subject to ten percent interest on the payment and
attorney's fees.
Buttressing the decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District,
is the Second District's opinion in Pioneer Life Insurance v.
Heidenfeldt. 773 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) . In Heiclenf elflt,
the court held that section 627.613, Florida Statutes (1997),
which is substantially similar to section 627.736(4), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1996), subjects an insurer to a ten percent
interest penalty if it does not timely reimburse an insured, but
does not prohibit the insurer from defending the claim if it
does not timely reimburse.

Heidenfeldt. 773 So. 2d at 77.

Further, as cited by the court in Heidenfeldt, the Florida
Supreme Court stated in AIU Insurance Company v. Block Marina
Investment, Inc., 544 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1989):
We do not believe that the legislature intended,
by the enactment of section 627.426(2), to give an
insured coverage which is expressly excluded from the
policy or to resurrect coverage under a policy or an
endorsement which is no longer in effect, simply
because an insurer fails to comply with the terms of
the aforementioned statute. . . .
. . . . This Court recently reiterated the general
rule that, while the doctrine of estoppel may be used
7

to prevent a forfeiture of insurance coverage, the
doctrine may not be used to create or extend coverage.
Block, 544 So. 2d at 999-1000.

Both of these decisions support

the conclusion reached by the Fourth and Fifth Districts that an
insurer's failure to obtain a written report within thirty days
of receiving written notice of a loss does not preclude the
insurer from defending on the basis that the medical bills are
not reasonable, not related and/or not necessary.
Accordingly, we align ourselves with the decisions of the
Fourth and the Fifth District and answer the certified question
in the negative.

Because the issue is currently pending before

the Florida Supreme Court, we certify conflict with the Third
District's decision in Perez.

We reverse the final summary

judgment entered in favor of Jones, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
BARFIELD and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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BENTON, J.
At issue is whether an insured whose medical bills Allstate
Insurance Company (Allstate) declines to pay can sue Allstate
for personal injury protection

(PIP) and automobile medical

payments

(medpay) benefits, without first paying the medical

provider, if the medical provider has not yet brought suit
against the insured.

Dino Kaklamanos and Keely Kaklamanos,

petitioners here, were plaintiffs

in county

court.

Their

complaint proceeded on the theory that Allstate's failure to pay
a medical bill they had forwarded (or caused to be forwarded) to
Allstate breached the PIP and medpay provisions of their motor
vehicle insurance policy. On appeal from Escambia County Court,
the Circuit Court, First Circuit, affirmed the final judgment a
county

judge

entered

in

favor

of Allstate

Allstate's motion for summary judgment.

after

granting

We quash the circuit

court's judgment.
I.
The complaint the Kaklamanoses filed in county court on
April

6,

1999,

alleged

that

a

medical

provider,

Nu-Best

Diagnostics (NBD), had performed medically reasonable treatment
or testing on Keely Kaklamanos on January 27, 1999; that an
automobile accident in which Ms. Kaklamanos had been injured on
or about February

17, 1998, made the treatment

or testing

necessary; and that NBD's bill had been sent to Allstate, the
Kaklamanoses' motor vehicle insurer; but that, despite the
Kaklamanoses'
precedent

to

compliance

"with

entitlement
2

all

statutory

requirements

to benefits," Allstate had

refused to pay the bill, even in part.
Allstate

disputed

the

allegation

that

the

automobile

accident made the services for which NBD billed

reasonably

medically necessary, but did not dispute other salient facts.
The parties agreed that an automobile accident had occurred and
that

Allstate's

policy

was

in

effect

at

the

time.

The

Kaklamanoses admitted that they had not paid NBD's bill and that
NBD had not filed suit against them for nonpayment.

Allstate

admitted that it had been duly notified of the circumstances
allegedly surrounding the injuries "by means of the 'No-Fault'
application-for-benefits claim form."
Conceding that NBD's bill remained unpaid only because
Allstate disputed its reasonable medical necessity in relation
to the accident, Allstate moved for summary judgment on the
basis of the following policy provision:
If an insured person incurs medical
expenses which [Allstate] deem[s] to be
unreasonable or unnecessary, [Allstate] may
•refuse to pay for those medical expenses and
contest them.
If the insured person is sued by a medical
services
provider
because
[Allstate]
refuse [s] to pay medical expenses which
[Allstate] deem[s] to be unreasonable or
unnecessary, [Allstate] will pay resulting
defense costs and any resulting judgment
against the insured person. [Allstate] will
choose the counsel. The insured person must
cooperate with [Allstate] in the defense of
any claim or lawsuit. If [Allstate] ask[s]
3

an insured person to attend hearings or
trials, [Allstate] will pay up to $50.00 per
day for loss of wages or salary. [Allstate]
will also pay other reasonable expenses
incurred at [its] request.
On grounds that Ms. Kaklamanos had "eschewed the indemnification
and defense provisions of her policy with" Allstate, the county
court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment, ruling
that there were "no damages to pursue in this action nor can any
result in the future," and entered summary judgment in favor of
Allstate accordingly.

On appeal, the circuit court affirmed.

II.
Initially, we must decide whether the certiorari petition
the Kaklamanoses have addressed to the circuit court's decision
falls within

the

jurisdiction."
(Fla. 2000).

limited

"scope

of

common

law

certiorari

Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 774 So. 2d 679, 682

Only if "the circuit court's decision constituted

a denial of procedural due process, application of incorrect
law, or a miscarriage of justice," Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 683, do
we properly decide the question their petition presents.
Certiorari is a common-law writ which
issues in the sound judicial discretion of
the court to an inferior court, not to take
the place of an appeal, but to cause the
entire record of the inferior court to be
brought up in order that it may be
determined from the face thereof whether the
inferior
court
has
exceeded
its
4

jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according
to the essential requirements of law.
Confined to its legitimate scope, the writ
may issue within the court's discretion to
correct the procedure of courts wherein they
have not observed those requirements of the
law which are deemed to be essential to the
administration of justice. . . , Failure to
observe the essential requirements of law
means failure to accord due process of law
within
the
contemplation
of
the
Constitution, or the commission of an error
so fundamental in character as to fatally
infect the judgment and render it void. . .
It seems to be the settled law of this
state that the duty of a court to apply to
admitted facts a correct principle of law is
such a fundamental and essential element of
the judicial process that a litigant cannot
be said to have had the remedy by due course
of
law,
guaranteed
[by
the
Florida
Constitution], if the judge fails or refuses
to perform that duty.
State v. Smith, 118 So. 2d 792, 795

(Fla. 1st DCA 1960)

(footnotes omitted) (quoted with approval in Haines City Cmty.
Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 527 (Fla. 1995)).
the

record,

including

the briefs

filed

in

Examination of
circuit

court,

persuades us that the circuit court applied1 the incorrect law

lu

The certiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal
may be sought to review . . . final orders of circuit courts
acting in their review capacity." Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b) (2) .
The circuit court's per curiam affirmance in the present case is
such an order. "County court litigants . . . are not precluded
from seeking review in the district court of appeal when the
circuit court affirms without opinion, nor are they limited by
Article V [of the Florida Constitution]." Rich v. Fisher. 655
So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
5

in the present case.
petition

because

We reach and decide the merits of the

the

court's

purely

"sufficiently egregious or fundamental."

legal

error

was

Haines City Cmty.

Dev. , 658 So. 2d at 531. See, e.g. , Rader v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
26 Fla. L. Weekly D1430, D1431 (Fla. 4th DCA June 6, 2001);
Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. MTM Diagnostics, Inc., 754 So.

2d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Glebe Life & Accident Ins, Cc,
v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 539 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989) .
III.
The policy language on which Allstate relies does not in
terms purport to place any restrictions on an insured's right to
sue, if PIP or medpay benefits are not paid in a timely fashion.
Allstate cannot legally, moreover, diminish2 the extent of its
PIP

and

medpay

provisions.

undertakings

by

adding

or

amending

policy

See generally Young v. Progressive Southeastern

Ins. Co. . 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000) (holding uninsured motorist
policies must conform3 to statutory requirements).

Section

2

Amicus curiae argues that the policy language on which
Allstate relies "is fully consistent with the no-fault law," and
affords insureds more, not less, protection "by establishing an
insurer's contractual obligation to pay all costs of defending
claims and any resulting judgments."
3

"Any insurance policy . . . otherwise valid which contains
any condition or provision not in compliance with the
requirements of this code shall . . . be construed and applied

6

627.736(4),

Florida

benefits M u e

Statutes

(1997)

makes

PIP

and

medpay

and payable as loss accrues, upon receipt of

reasonable proof of such loss and the amount of expenses and
loss incurred which are covered by the policy."
As the Ivey court recently explained, "the purpose of the
no-fault statutory scheme is to ^provide swift and virtually
automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with
his life without undue financial interruption.'

Government

Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So.2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA
1987) (citing

Comeau

(Fla.1978))."

v.

Safeco

Ivey,

774

Ins.
So.

2d

Co.,

356

So.2d

at

683-84.

790

&££ §

627.736(4) (b), Fla. Stat. (1997) (uPersonal injury protection
insurance benefits paid pursuant to this section shall be
overdue

if not paid

within

3 0 days after

the

insurer is

furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of
the amount of same.").

We have previously held:

in accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have
applied had such policy . . . been in full compliance with this
code." § 627.418(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swearingen, 590 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA
1991); see also § 627.412(2), Fla. Stat. (1997) (uNo policy
shall contain any provision inconsistent with or contradictory
to any standard or uniform provision used or required to be
used, but the department may approve any substitute provision
which is, in its opinion, not less favorable in any particular
to the insured or beneficiary than the provisions otherwise
required."); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Suazo. 614 So. 2d 1071
(Fla. 1992).
7

[T]he statutory language is clear and
unambiguous. The insurance company has
thirty days in which to verify the claim
after
receipt
of
an application
for
benefits. There is no provision in the
statute to toll this time limitation. The
burden is clearly upon the insurer to
authenticate the claim within the statutory
time period. To rule otherwise would render
the recently enacted "no-fault" insurance
statute a "no-pay" plan--a result we are
sure was not intended by the legislature.
Dunmore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502, 502 (Fla.
1st

DCA

1974).

See

also

§

627.736 (4) (f) ,

Fla.

Stat.

(1997)("Medical payments insurance, if available in a policy of
motor vehicle insurance, shall pay the portion of any claim for
personal injury protection medical benefits which is otherwise
covered but is not payable due to the coinsurance provision of
paragraph

(1) (a) , regardless of whether the full amount of

personal injury protection coverage has been exhausted."); see
generally Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Med., 753
So. 2d 55, 59

(Fla. 2000) (uAn objective of Florida's Motor

Vehicle No-Fault Law was to provide persons

injured

in an

accident with prompt payment of benefits.").
An insured's claim for PIP or medpay benefits "is a first
party claim in contract for failure to pay the contractual
obligation
fault."

for

personal

injuries

sustained,

regardless

of

Levy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 580 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla.

4th DCA 1991) .

Here petitioners adequately alleged that they

sustained damages as a result of Allstate's failing to pay NBD's
bill for thirty days.4

See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Lee, 678 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996) (holding that, once thirty
days elapsed after receipt of the Lees1

PIP claim, "and no

benefits were paid on the claim, assuming they were properly
due, [5] State Farm had effectively breached their contract with

4

The complaint alleged generally compliance with all
statutory conditions precedent. Considering the same question
presented here, another judge of the Escambia County Court
reached the opposite conclusion and held, in denying Allstate's
motion for summary judgment in a different case:
In addition to the inevitable effects on
the doctor/patient relationship, Allstate's
argument that plaintiff will sustain no
damages as a result of wrongful non-payment
fails because the indemnification provision
ignores the harmful consequences to an
insured's credit history and financial
future caused by the mere filing of a credit
driven law suit. Even if Allstate pays any
judgment obtained by the medical care
provider, the insured's credit history will
reflect the untimely payment and subsequent
judgment.
Jones v, Allstate InSt GSLL., 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 541, 542
(Fla. Escambia Cty. Ct. Mar. 26, 2000). The circuit court's per
curiam affirmance has not resolved the question even within the
First Circuit. See Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Court of
Appeal, 434 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla. 1983).
5

We have recently held that the lapse of thirty days does
not cut off an insurer's right to defend on grounds that medical
bills are unreasonable or unnecessary.
See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. 1D00-3009 (Fla. 1st DCA July 13,
2001) . See also Gurney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 5D003775 (Fla. 5th DCA July 6, 2001); AIU Ins. Co. v. Daidone. 760
So. 2d 1110, 1112-13 (Fla. 4th DCA), review pending, SCOO-1547

(Fla. July 24, 2000); Jones Y , State Farm Mutt Auto, Ins, Co,,
694 So. 2d 165, 166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) . But see Perez v. State
9

[the Lees].").
While upayment shall not be deemed overdue when the insurer
has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer
responsible

for the payment,"

is not

§ 627.736 (4) (b) , Fla. Stat.

(1997), we agree with the Third District "that the legislature
provided no [other] exceptions to the thirty-day period, and
that courts will not countenance insurers' attempts to create
their own means of tolling that period."

Fortune Ins. Co. v.

Pacheco. 695 So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
IV.
The present case should be distinguished

from Rader v.

Allstate Ins. Co. . 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1430 (Fla. 4th DCA June 6,
2001), where the Fourth District recently held that the absence
of any unpaid medical bills defeated the insured's standing to
allege an anticipatory breach.6 The majority opinion quoted the

Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 746 So. 2d 1123, 1125-26 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999) , review granted sub nom. United Auto Ins. Co. v.
Rodriguez, 767 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2000) .
6

Also distinguishable from the present case are two out-ofstate decisions on which Allstate relies: Ny v. Metro. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co. , 1998 Mass. App. Div. 179 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1998),
1998 WL 603138 (upholding summary judgment against insureds
where insurance company had paid bills in part and obtained
releases from the providers for the balances) and McGill v.
Auto. Ass'n, 526 N.W.2d 12, 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming summary disposition where insurers had upaid to
plaintiffs' health care providers amounts that they considered
reasonable" and the insurance commissioner had directed no-fault
insurers to provide claimants with "complete protection from
10

circuit court's decision, which explained:
The Court below did not err in dismissing
the Amended Complaint, which alleged an
anticipatory breach of contract. Although
the insurer's letter stating that it would
not pay for further medical treatment may be
an anticipatory breach of contract, such
breach only relieves the Plaintiff from the
condition precedent of submitting her claims
to the Appellee 30 days prior to filing
suit. Peachtree Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walden,
759 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
The alleged anticipatory breach did not
relieve the Plaintiff of the necessity of
incurring and alleging damages in order to
state a cause of action for breach of
contract. Miller v. Nifakos, 655 So. 2d 192
(Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Plowden & Roberts, Inc.
v. Conway, 192 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA
1966) . The Plaintiff failed to allege that
she sustained any damages as a result of the
Defendant's alleged breach. Further, a
plaintiff cannot obtain a judgment for
insurance benefits which have not as yet
accrued. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 345
So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) ; Cruz v.
Union Gen. Ins., 586 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA
1991); Monsanto Co. v. Fuqua, 280 So. 2d 496
(Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Walden.
Since the
Plaintiff did not incur any medical expenses
which the
Defendant did not reimburse, and any damages
the Plaintiff might have sustained as a
result of the alleged anticipatory breach
are too speculative to sustain an action for
breach of contract, this Court declines the
opportunity to affirm the dismissal but
remand with instructions to allow the
Plaintiff to amend her complaint. Augusting

economic loss" including any exposure to "harassment, dunning,
disparagement of credit, or lawsuit as a result of a dispute
between the health care provider and the insurer").
11

v, Southern Pell Tel, & Tel, Co,, 9i so. 2d
320 (Fla. 1956) distinguishing Byers v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 So. 2d 875
(Fla. 1954)(dismissal appropriate where on
the face of the complaint damages are too
speculative to be recoverable).
The Court understands the Appellant's
frustration at the inability to obtain
relief
for
the
'insurer's
alleged
anticipatory breach. However, if she had
incurred reasonable, necessary, and related
medical expenses after the insurer's letter,
she would have had a cause of action against
the Appellee for those claims without
submitting them to the insurer and waiting
3 0 days.
Rader, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D1431.

Judge Gunther's dissenting

opinion argued that the insured had standing to assert an
anticipatory breach even in the absence of unpaid medical bills.
See id. at D1432 (Gunther, J., dissenting).

Nothing in either

Rader opinion offers any support for the view that an insured
cannot sue for PIP or medpay benefits thirty days after properly
presenting a medical bill that the insurer refuses to pay.
V.
An insured who incurs reasonable and necessary medical
expenses on account of an automobile accident sustains losses
and incurs liability for PIP and medpay purposes, whether or not
the medical bills have been paid.

An insured, who is under no

legal obligation to assign benefits to providers, may not,
indeed, be able to pay such bills without first receiving PIP or
medpay benefits. The recipient of such bills is entitled to sue
12

a defaulting insurer for PIP and medpay benefits.

An insured

may be damaged by an insurance company's failure to pay a claim
even if the insured has not already paid or been sued by the
medical provider.
Allstate's argument in the present case blurs important
distinctions

between

contracts

of

indemnity

requiring

reimbursement of moneys actually paid and liability insurance
contracts like the Allstate policy at issue here:
The
distinction
between
contracts
of
indemnity against liability and contracts of
indemnity against loss has caused a good
deal of confusion.
The former may be
defined as an undertaking of the indemnitor
to stand in the place of the indemnitee in
the performance of some act, as in the
payment of a debt due to a third person.
The right of action springs into existence
with the accrual of liability and the
failure to discharge it. The contract of
indemnity against loss is an undertaking to
repay or reimburse the indemnitee or to make
good the actual loss which he may suffer.
The indemnitee, therefore, cannot recover on
the covenant until he has paid or otherwise
satisfied the obligation.
Gaines v. MacArthur, 254 So. 2d 8, 10

(Fla. 3d DCA 1971)

(quoting Case Comment, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 193 (1936)).

A right

of action arises thirty days after notice to Allstate that
reasonable and necessary medical treatment against which it has
insured has resulted in a debt.
VI.
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We quash the circuit court's decision because it applies a
fundamentally incorrect rule of law.7 The Florida Motor Vehicle
No-Fault Law makes Allstate an ''indemnitor against liability''
for reasonable

and necessary

medical

expenses

persons the PIP or medpay provisions cover,

u

incurred

by

An expense is the

same as a debt, and it has been incurred when liability for

payment attaches."

Reliance Mutt Life Inst CQ» VT Booher, 166

So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari,
and quash the decision under review, with directions that the
circuit court reverse the county court's summary judgment and
remand to county court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
BOOTH and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR.

7

But, because we do not construe Allstate's policy as
impeding access to the courts, or as otherwise inconsistent with
the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, we need not, and
therefore do not, reach the Kaklamanoses' contention that the
policy fails to conform to the requirements of sections 627.730.7405, Florida Statutes (1997), or of article I, section 21 of
the Florida Constitution. See generally Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Med., 753 So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 2000)
(holding that section 627.736(5), Florida Statutes (1995),
"denies medical providers access to courts" and "arbitrarily
distinguishes between medical providers and insureds").
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Exhibit E

38

The last word
The futility of trying to beat the odds
Whether you're a chronic speeder or a bank robber, your luck always runs out eventually.
Author George Shaffner takes a look at the statistics of engaging in risky behavior.

For most popular offenses, the odds are
against getting caught. That's why they're
popular. But offenders still manage to get
caught with remarkable consistency.
Billy Ray DeNiall, a second-year entrepreneur at the local high school, believes
he is an undiscovered Formula One racing
talent who needs to exercise his aptitude
on a regular basis. So he drives his Dodge
pickup truck at a steady 15 miles per
hour over the speed limit to and from
school every day.
The local police, who are understaffed,
can allocate only one car to patrol the
roads leading to and from the high
school. Since it is a large high school,
there are so many roads, and there is so
little time, the police can apprehend an
average of only one in every hundred high
school speeders on any given patrol.
Billy Ray is a keen observer of local
law enforcement in action. He knows that
he has only a 1 percent chance of getting
caught on any given trip and just a 1-in50 chance of getting caught in any given
day. So he speeds with confidence and
consistency.
But the school year is 180 days in
length. Unless Billy Ray mends his ways,
he will be ticketed an average of 3.6 times
per school year, a total of 10 or 11 tickets
in his three years to graduation. The fines
will be substantial, Billy Ray's already
stratospheric insurance rates will escape
Earth's gravitational influence, and his
license may be revoked.
The same principle holds for more serious forms of illegal activity. Although the
odds may be against getting caught any
one time, the chances accumulate with
repetition. Also, since law enforcement
officials are sensitive to taxpayer opinion,
the odds of getting caught tend to
increase with the severity of the offense.
If, for example, the chances of robbing
a bank without getting caught are 75 percent, then one would expect three out of
four bank robbers to be on the loose. But
thieves never rob just one bank, because a
single crime hardly adds up to a productive career. Besides, the odds are always
against getting caught the next time.
Let's suppose that a career in bank
theft requires about one robbery every
four months or so. Then, even at a 75
percent probability of success per theft,
the chances of avoiding apprehension are
less then 32 percent by the fourth heist
(.75 x .75 x .75 x .75). Thus, more than
two bank robbers in three will celebrate
their first anniversary on the job in jail.
After two years, just one in 10 bank robTHE WEEK August 10, 2001

Speeders and bank robbers share an inevitable fate: They get caught.

bers will still be plying the trade, which is
why there are more felons in jail than
there are on the street.
According to local law-enforcement
officials, in fact, 90 percent of all bank
robbers in the Puget Sound area are apprehended. One ought to seriously question
the sanity of any career that offers a 90
percent attrition rate after only a few paydays, much less one that results in a
multi-year engagement at a local penitentiary shortly after apprehension.
The odds of getting caught also hold
for legal but potentially lethal activities.
If the chances of having unprotected sex
without contracting a social disease are
90 percent per encounter, then the odds
of making it an extracurricular hobby, say
one new rendezvous per month through
two consecutive years of junior college,
are less than 8 percent. That means that
the odds of at least one disease transmission, the consequences of which may be
fatal, are more than 92 percent. Using the
same 90 percent probability of avoidance
per monthly conquest, the odds of contracting one or more sexually transmitted
diseases will exceed 99 percent prior to
the completion of a four-year bachelor's
degree.
An informed sense of statistical mortality can also be useful in career planning. If, for instance, your chances of
successfully squeezing an extra $200 out
of your monthly expense report are 98
percent, then you might expect to

increase your income by $2,400 per year
with impunity. However, by the 35th
month, your odds of getting caught will
exceed 50 percent. In that period, you
will have "made" an extra $7,000. But
the consequences of getting caught are
likely to include immediate termination.
If your salary is $48,000 per year, and if
it takes you six months to find an equivalent job, then your net loss, excluding
humiliation, will be $17,000 ($24,000 in
salary less $7,000 in improperly claimed
expenses), which is 85 times $200 per
month.
Arithmetic is a hard master. It will
punish anyone who believes that a pattern
of mistakes or unnecessary risks is a
series of isolated, one-time occurrences.
America's graveyards are full of dead people who thought they could make a career
out of repetitive stupidity. America's jails
are full of living people, currently 1.5 million of them, who thought they could
make a career out of crime. America's
streets are full of unemployed people who
thought they could make a career out of
not working.
With repetition, the odds of getting
caught always move rapidly toward certainty. It is the Law; there are no exceptions. Including you.
Adapted from The Arithmetic of Life and
Dearh by George Shaffner. ©1999 by
George Shaffner. Reprinted with permission from Ba IIan tine Books.

